16 - Mouritsen (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

10/21/2019 7:41 PM

CONTRACT INTERPRETATION WITH CORPUS
LINGUISTICS
Stephen C. Mouritsen*
Abstract: Courts and scholars disagree about the quantum of evidence that is necessary to
determine the meaning of contractual provisions. Formalists favor excluding extrinsic
evidence unless the contractual text is found to be ambiguous. Contextualists, by contrast,
look to extrinsic evidence to support claims about contractual meaning even absent a finding
of ambiguity. The formalist approach is faulted for failing to provide a meaningful account of
the parties’ intentions and for placing heavy reliance upon the judge’s own linguistic
intuitions and general-use English dictionaries—both problematic guides to plain meaning.
At the same time, the contextualist approach may impose significant costs on the contracting
parties and invite strategic behavior.
Corpus linguistics offers a middle way. Corpus linguistics draws on evidence of language
use from large, coded, electronic collections of natural language—language used in natural
settings, rather than language elicited through interviews or surveys. These may include
collections of texts from newspapers, magazines, academic articles, or transcribed
conversations. These collections of texts are referred to as corpora (the plural of corpus).
Linguistic corpora can be designed to model the linguistic conventions of a wide variety of
speech communities, industries, or linguistic registers. Because large, sophisticated linguistic
corpora are freely available, language evidence from linguistic corpora offers a
comparatively low-cost alternative to the vast quantity of extrinsic evidence permitted by
contextualist interpretive approaches. Moreover, by evaluating corpus evidence, judges and
lawyers can create a more accurate, evidence-based picture of contractual meaning than can
be found in the formalist judge’s linguistic intuition or in a general-use dictionary.
Moreover, corpora can provide objective evidence of the linguistic conventions of the
communities that draft and are governed by the agreements judges and lawyers are called
upon to interpret. Corpus evidence can give content to otherwise vague legal concepts and
provide linguistic evidence to aid in the evaluation of claims about the meaning (or
ambiguity) of a contractual text. Below I outline how corpus linguistic methods may be
applied to the interpretation of contracts.
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INTRODUCTION
When interpreting the undefined terms in a contract, judges often turn
to the so-called Plain Meaning Rule, an interpretive heuristic that
requires courts to consider only the text of the contract and exclude
extrinsic evidence, provided that the text of the contract is unambiguous.
In a familiar formulation, the Rule states that “if a ‘clear, unambiguous’
meaning is discernible in the language of the contract, no extrinsic
evidence of surrounding circumstances may be admitted to challenge
this interpretation.”1
The Plain Meaning Rule is often justified on the grounds that it
prevents strategic behavior and the fear that allowing contracts to be
“challenged in the name of the parties’ actual intent” will “produce
disorder or even chaos, waiting to be exploited by unscrupulous litigants
who demand a bonus to do what they already promised to do.”2 In such
cases, “the disagreement often manifests itself in the litigation positions
of the parties, whose interpretations may more realistically reflect their
lawyers’ clever post hoc arguments than any serious dispute about
meaning.”3 The Rule is also justified on the grounds of efficiency.4
Parties may prefer a strong Plain Meaning Rule believing that it lowers
judicial search costs by limiting the number of sources a judge has to
1. 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.7, at 33 (Joseph M. Perillo ed. 1998).
This Article addresses the Plain Meaning Rule and focuses on questions of linguistic ambiguity in
contractual texts. While the distinction between the Plain Meaning Rule and the Parol Evidence
Rule isn’t always clear, here I adopt the framework suggested by Professor Eric Posner. Posner
restates that the Parole Evidence Rule as follow: “A court will refuse to use evidence of the parties’
prior negotiations in order to interpret a written contract unless the writing is (1) incomplete, (2)
ambiguous, or (3) the product of fraud, mistake, or a similar bargaining defect.” Eric A. Posner, The
Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 533, 534 (1998). Under this formulation, the Plain Meaning Rule is the second
exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. Id. at 534 n.1.
2. Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol-Evidence Rule, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 804 (2002).
3. Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
859, 861 (2004).
4. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477,
1517 (1999).
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consider to find plain meaning.5 A strong Plain Meaning Rule may also
allow judges to resolve more cases at earlier stages of the litigation (for
example, at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage) and thus
“reduce the number of intractable credibility issues in trials for breach of
contract.”6
While intuitively appealing, the Plain Meaning Rule faces a number
of challenges. For example, consider the case of an ecological tourism
company that seeks to recover from its insurer for failing to defend a
negligence action arising from a customer’s drowning death that
occurred while snorkeling.7 The insurance contract at issue makes clear
that it “does not apply to ‘bodily injury’ [including death] to any person
while practicing for or participating in any sports or athletic contest or
exhibition that you sponsor.”8 This raises the question: Is snorkeling a
sport? To resolve this question the court invokes the Plain Meaning Rule
and cites dictionary definitions that show that sport is defined as a rulebased athletic competition, and that snorkeling must therefore fall
outside of the plain meaning of sport.9
The court, like many courts before it, ignored a perfectly wellattested,10 alternative sense11 of the word it was purporting to define.
Indeed, the same dictionaries cited by the court also define sport as a
“recreational activity,” without reference to competition.12 The court not
only failed to take into account an alternative sense, but had no way of
knowing the comparative prevalence of the competing senses in the
relevant contractual context and no basis for concluding that one should
be preferred over the other. These problems faced in the snorkeling case
are hardly idiosyncratic. They are similar to problems faced by other
courts when called upon to interpret contractual language.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Hawaiian Isle Adventures, Inc. v. North Am. Capacity Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D.
Haw. 2009).
8. Id. at 1193.
9. Id. at 1197.
10. Throughout this Article, I use the words “attest” and “attestation” in their linguistic sense to
mean “to establish or verify the usage of [a word],” see Attest, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/attest [https://perma.cc/QET8-7ZTB], and not in their
legal sense to mean “[t]o bear witness; testify.” See Attest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
11. Throughout this Article, I use the word “sense” to refer to “[o]ne of several meanings that
can be established for a word or phrase and covered by a definition in a reference work.” R.R.K.
HARTMANN & GREGORY JAMES, DICTIONARY OF LEXICOGRAPHY 125 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
12. See infra notes 141–148.
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Linguistic corpora can help judges and lawyers evaluate and work to
resolve problems of finding meaning in contractual language. Corpus
linguistics may chart a middle way between the formalist and
contextualist approaches to contract interpretation, which permits the
consideration of extrinsic evidence even absent a finding of ambiguity.
As discussed below, corpus linguistics provides judges and lawyers with
objective information about language use without some of the
prohibitive costs and risks of strategic behavior associated with
contextualist approaches to interpretation. Corpus linguistics may help
give content to otherwise vague legal concepts like “plain meaning,”
“ambiguity,” and “context.” And corpus linguistics can provide evidence
of language usage that cannot be obtained through introspection or from
dictionaries—evidence of the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic
contexts in which contractual terms are used, and evidence of the
language usage from particular speech communities at a particular point
in history. For example, while dictionaries typically only take account of
word-level meaning, a corpus user may examine usage at a phrase or
even sentence level. Linguistic corpora can be constructed to represent
the linguistic conventions of a particular industry or region. They can be
designed to reflect the linguistic conventions of different time periods.
They can provide their users with evidence of language use that is not
available in a dictionary and not available via introspection.
But corpora are not a panacea. They are not a black box that will
provide definitive, objective answers to every interpretive question.
While linguistic corpora can present objective evidence of language use,
corpus design and the interpretation of corpus evidence requires human
judgment.
Corpora can provide evidence of the way that language is used by the
contracting parties—evidence that was not previously available via
dictionaries or introspection. It is not possible in this Article to anticipate
all of the ways in which corpus evidence may be brought to bear on
questions of contract interpretation. In this respect, the problems
discussed below are both illustrative, but also exploratory—they
demonstrate the kinds of language evidence that corpora make available,
but also highlight questions that require additional research.
Corpus linguistics has already begun to play a role in the
interpretation of legal texts, both of statutes13 and of the Constitution.14
13. See People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (Mich. 2016); State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d
1258, 1271 (Utah 2015) (Lee, C.J., concurring); Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging
Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018); Note, Statutory Interpretation — Interpretive Tools
— Utah Supreme Court Debates Judicial Use of Corpus Linguistics. — State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d
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And linguistic corpora have also played a role in discussions of
trademark law.15 To date, no one has addressed the contribution
linguistic corpora can make in providing an evidence-based means of
evaluating questions of contractual plain meaning and ambiguity.
Part I outlines how corpus linguistic methods may be applied to
questions of contract interpretation. Part II discusses both the theoretical
and operational challenges of current approaches to plain meaning.
Part III introduces corpus linguistics as an alternative to traditional
approaches to plain meaning. Part IV addresses four problems of
contract interpretation to illustrate the corpus-based approach. Part V
discusses both contributions of—and challenges to—the application of
corpus methods to questions of contract interpretation. Part VI concludes
this Article.
I.

CHALLENGES TO PLAIN MEANING IN CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION

Courts face a number of challenges when they seek to determine the
meaning of contractual terms. These challenges are addressed below.
A.

Formalism, Contextualism, and the Middle Way

Courts and scholars disagree about the quantum of evidence that is
necessary to determine the meaning of contractual provisions (even in
the absence of a finding of ambiguity).16 Contextualists, following the
Restatement of Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),

1258 (Utah 2015), 129 HARV. L. REV. 1468 (2016); Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard
Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 156 (2011); Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional
Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1915, 1915 (2010)
[hereinafter Mouritsen, The Dictionary is Not a Fortress].
14. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are Officers of the United States?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443
(2018) (discussing the original meaning of the phrase “officers of the United States”); Lee J. Strang,
How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus Linguistics to
Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181 (2017) (discussing the use of
linguistic corpora in constitutional interpretation); Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics
Help Make Originalism Scientific?, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 57 (2016) (same); James C Phillips,
Daniel M. Ortner, Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to
Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 20 (2016) (same).
15. See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical
Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945 (2018); Paul J. Heald &
Robert Brauneis, The Myth of Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of Trademark Dilution by Product
and Trade Names, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2533, 2574–75 (2011).
16. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 572 (1998).
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look to extrinsic evidence even before there is a determination that the
language of the contract is ambiguous.17 This evidence may include “the
situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the
transaction, preliminary negotiations and statements made therein,
usages of trade, and the course of dealing between the parties.”18 Critics
fault the contextualist approach to finding meaning in a contract for
imposing significant costs on the contracting parties and inviting
strategic behavior that may ultimately deny contracting parties the
benefit of their bargain.19 Moreover, it is not always clear that evidence
of a consistent usage of trade, for example, actually exists, or that
judges’ evaluation of that evidence is likely to be accurate or
predictable.20
Formalists, by contrast, justify the Plain Meaning Rule on the grounds
of efficiency and predictability, and they exclude extrinsic evidence
absent a finding of ambiguity. Critics fault the formalist approach for
failing to provide a meaningful account of the parties’ intentions.21
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (noting
that consideration of extrinsic evidence should “is not limited to cases where it is determined that
the language used is ambiguous”).
18. Id.
19. See Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) (critiquing
the contextualist approach because “even when the transaction is very sizeable, even if it involves
only sophisticated parties, even if it was negotiated with the aid of counsel, even if it results in
contract language that is devoid of ambiguity, costly and protracted litigation cannot be avoided if
one party has a strong enough motive for challenging the contract.”); Gregory Klass, Contract
Exposition
and
Formalism
(Feb.
2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2913620 [https://perma.cc/TCE2-7R3G] (“The
more evidence one allows into interpretation, the less certain the outcome. The costs of such
uncertainty in the contractual setting can be especially high. A party that wants to organize its
behavior in light of the legal effects of a contractual agreement needs to be able to predict how an
adjudicator will later interpret that agreement. To the extent thicker interpretive rules reduce
predictability, they impose an additional cost on the parties.”).
20. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A
Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 715 (1999) (finding that “‘usages of trade’ and
‘commercial standards,’ as those terms are used by the Code, may not consistently exist, even in
relatively close-knit merchant communities.”); see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern
Economy, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 238, 250 (Gregory Klass et al.
eds., 2014) (“[C]ourt determinations relating to the existence, content, and scope of usages are
likely to be both inaccurate and highly unpredictable, as they are typically made on the basis of very
limited information.”).
21. See Klass, supra note 19, at 64 (“Although plain meaning rules reduce the costs of
adjudication, increase predictability and can provide interpretive accuracy with respect to literal
meaning, they create a higher risk of correspondence errors. Plain meaning rules often produce
literalist interpretations, and literal meaning is sometimes a poor proxy for the parties’ actual
agreement, and identification of the parties’ actual intentions and understandings is the ultimate goal
of contract interpretation. Where there is likely to be a gap, a thicker use meaning rule, despite its
extra costs, might be the better design choice.”). But see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The

16 - Mouritsen (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

10/21/2019 7:41 PM

1344

[Vol. 94:1337

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Moreover, formalist decisionmaking about Plain Meaning often places
heavy reliance upon the judge’s own linguistic intuitions and upon
general-use English dictionaries, both of which are problematic guides to
Plain Meaning.22
The use of language evidence from linguistic corpora may chart a
middle way between the formalist and contextualist approaches to
contract interpretation. The corpus can provide the court with objective
evidence of language usage and give the court a more accurate picture of
the linguistic conventions of the contracting parties than is currently
available through traditional modes of formalist interpretation. And the
use of language evidence from linguistic corpora, while certainly
requiring the expenditure of some time and effort, may be less costly
than assembling and presenting evidence of usage of trade, course of
performance, and drafting and negotiating history that imposes cost
burdens on parties in contextualist jurisdictions. Moreover, to the extent
that the court or the parties looks to existing corpora for language
evidence, it may be possible to address some of the concerns about
strategic behavior for current contextualist approaches.
B.

Theoretical Challenges to Plain Meaning

When courts speak of plain meaning, they do so without a coherent,
shared, well-defined, objective notion of what plain meaning actually
means.23 Similarly, in spite of its conceptual importance in the
interpretation of contracts, courts lack a coherent, shared, well-defined,
objective definition of what ambiguity actually means. Nor do they have
a shared and coherent method for discovering the ostensibly plain
language of a contract. While the Plain Meaning Rule is subject to a host
Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract
Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 311–12 (1985) (arguing that “[r]igorous application of the plainmeaning rule reduces interpretation error by encouraging more careful choices of clear, predefined
signals”).
22. See infra section II.B.
23. Indeed, even the justices of the United States Supreme Court appear unable to agree on the
definition of plain meaning. See Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103
YALE L.J. 1561, 1563–65 (1994); see also Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund: Searching for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous Ambiguity,
4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 15 (1995) (“[T]he definition of ‘plain meaning’ is itself anything but plain.
How much ambiguity is required before the meaning of a provision becomes ambiguous? Words are
hardly ever entirely free of ambiguity and there is almost always room for disagreement based on at
least plausible readings.”); Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnellDouglas is Not Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 764–
65 (2006) (“While the term ‘plain meaning’ exudes a sense of simplicity, such an assumption would
be misplaced because the exact contours of plain meaning interpretation are debated.”).
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of criticisms and has been rejected by the UCC24 and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts,25 it is nevertheless the approach taken by the
majority of U.S. jurisdictions,26 and, thus, continues to play an important
role in the interpretation of contracts.
Things don’t improve when courts turn to the identification of
ambiguity. “The problem,” observed Professor Lawrence Solan,
“perhaps ironically, is that the concept of ambiguity is itself perniciously
ambiguous. People do not always use the term in the same way, and the
differences often appear to go unnoticed.”27 As Professor Brian G.
Slocum has observed, “the determination of ambiguity by the judiciary
is entirely standardless and discretionary. The definitions of ambiguity
used by courts are themselves vague, ambiguous, and unhelpful.”28 Most
states define a contractual provision as ambiguous if “it is reasonably or
fairly susceptible of different interpretations,” or simply “capable or
susceptible of different interpretations.”29 Such definitions leave open a
wide range of potential interpretations for contractual terms and provide
little guidance to courts struggling to take their role as the ultimate
arbiters of contractual clarity and ambiguity seriously.30
24. Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol Evidence Rule, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 824–25 (2002) (“Karl Llewellyn had built much of the Uniform
Commercial Code upon a rejection of the plain meaning rule and upon a concept of the ‘agreement
in fact,’ and by 1968, the Code had been adopted throughout the United States.”).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 212 cmt. b (“Plain meaning
and extrinsic evidence. It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence cannot change the plain meaning
of a writing, but meaning can almost never be plain except in a context. Accordingly, the rule stated
in Subsection (1) is not limited to cases where it is determined that the language used is ambiguous.
Any determination of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of the relevant
evidence of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction,
preliminary negotiations and statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of dealing
between the parties.”).
26. See Linzer, supra note 24, at 800 (citing KNIFFIN, supra note 1, § 24.7, at 34).
27. Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
859, 859 (2004).
28. Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis,
and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791,
794 (2010) (emphasis added); see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 570 n.55 (2003) (“Courts seldom distinguish between
‘vague’ and ‘ambiguous’ terms . . . . More narrowly, however, a word is vague to the extent that it
can apply to a wide spectrum of referents, or to referents that cluster around a modal ‘best instance,’
or to somewhat different referents in different people.”).
29. Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts
Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 184 n.30 (1995) (collecting
cases).
30. Even the notion of the parties’ intent is sometimes characterized as ambiguous. See Gregory
Klass, Interpretation and Construction in Contract Law 2 (Jan. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with Georgetown University Law Center), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
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Language evidence from linguistic corpora can help provide content
to otherwise vague terms in the law or help to identify conceptual
weaknesses with terms like “plain meaning,” “ambiguity,” and
“context.”
C.

Operational Challenges to Finding Meaning and Ambiguity

Even if courts had a shared, coherent theory of what plain meaning
actually meant, it is not clear that courts would be able to implement
such a theory with the tools at their disposal, in particular the courts’
own linguistic intuition and dictionaries.
1.

The Limits of Intuition about Plain Meaning and Ambiguity

Courts sometimes make determinations about the meaning of a
contract without referencing dictionaries, extrinsic evidence, or any
other evidence of meaning beyond the text of the contract.31 In such
circumstances, we can infer that the court is relying on the judge’s
linguistic intuition to determine what the contract means. The human
language faculty is an extraordinary system for communicating
information.32 But language users are not particularly adept at
objectively and predictably identifying and resolving lexical ambiguities
when faced with high-frequency, highly polysemous words—for
example, words that occur very often and that have a lot of different
senses.33 This is a problem because word frequency is correlated with
polysemy.34 That is, the more commonly a word is used, the more likely
article=2971&context=facpub [https://perma.cc/4S5V-LPV2] (noting that the notion of the parties’
“intent” is ambiguous because it is not clear whether it refers to the parties’ legal obligations or only their
intended exchange).
31. Slamow v. Delcol, 174 A.D.2d 725, 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (relying only on the text to
interpret a contract and holding that “when the terms of a written contract are clear and
unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be found within the four corners of the contract”).
32. See generally GISELA HÅKANSSON & JENNIE WESTANDER, COMMUNICATIONS IN HUMANS
AND OTHER ANIMALS 1–22 (2014) (distinguishing human language from other methods of
communication).
33. Scott Crossley et al., Polysemy and Frequency Use in English L2 Speakers, 60 LANGUAGE
LEARNING 573, 575 (2010). Historically, the reason for the ubiquity of polysemous words is
because people have preferred to take words and extend their meaning rather than create new words.
This preference, known as the law of least effort, states that speakers will economize their
vocabulary by extending word senses in order to conserve lexical storage space. Thus, over time,
word meanings are extended so that individual words possess multiple meanings. This is especially
true for more frequent words, which tend to be the most polysemous. Because frequent words have
the most senses, learners encounter highly polysemous words most often. However, highly
polysemous words, although unavoidable, also exhibit higher degrees of ambiguity and could thus
be more difficult to process. Id.
34. Id.
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it is to have many different senses.35 Consider that the verb to carry has
forty-three separately defined senses in the Oxford English Dictionary
(the “OED”), while the word bathymetry has only one.36 The more
common a word is, the more senses it has, and the more senses it has, the
more likely two people are to disagree as to its meaning in a given
context.37 This leads to the counterintuitive result that judges and
lawyers are more likely to disagree about the meaning of common words
than the meaning of uncommon words.
This cognitive limitation may not be the only challenge that courts
face when attempting to address questions of plain meaning and
ambiguity. At least one study has found that parties frequently and
systematically overestimate the degree to which they are likely to agree
with other parties to a contract.38 This phenomenon is referred to as false
consensus bias. Courts and parties may fail to recognize false consensus
bias and will, therefore, fail to recognize the legitimacy of different
readings of the contract.39 As a consequence, “a judge may consider
language to be plain when in fact different people do not understand it
the same way, and this may happen even when the judge’s
understanding is shared only by a minority of people in general.”40
In addition, at least one study has found that simple judgments about
ambiguity may be influenced by a party’s policy preferences.41 As a
result, “[t]he person who has a strong view about who ought to win a
case (for reasons apart from the text) has trouble seeing the plausibility

35. Id.
36. Compare Carry, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/28252?
rskey=MW9PwT&result=3 (last visited May 15, 2019), with Bathymetry, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/16174?redirectedFrom=bathymetry (last visited May 15, 2019).
37. Id.; see also ENEKO AGIRRE & PHILLIP EDMONDS, WORD SENSE DISAMBIGUATION:
ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATIONS 91 (2007) (noting “[h]igh polysemy has a detrimental effect” on
the performance of disambiguation tasks); George Tsatsornis et al., An Experimental Study on
Unsupervised Graph-based Word Sense Disambiguation in ALEXANDER GULBUKH,
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS AND INTELLIGENT TEXT PROCESSING 184, 193 (2010) (noting that
human annotators have higher rates of disagreement when tasked with disambiguating highly
polysemous words); KEITH BROWN & KEITH ALLAN, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEMANTICS 224
(2009) (noting that accuracy on word sense disambiguation tasks declines where finer-grained sense
distinctions are required).
38. See Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in
Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1285–94 (2008).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1294.
41. Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An
Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 271 (2010).
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of other ways of reading the statute involved.”42 In such circumstances,
“[i]f one person says that both proposed readings of a statute seem
plausible, and a colleague disagrees, finding one reading too strained,
what is there to do about it but for each to stamp his foot?”43
Results like those discussed in the preceding paragraph have been
called into question by a subsequent study of judges’ responses,
designed to “assess legal problems designed to trigger unconscious
political bias in members of the general public.”44 The study found that
“[j]udges of diverse cultural outlooks . . . converged on results in cases
that strongly divided comparably diverse members of the public,”45 and
that “professional judgment [of judges] can be expected to counteract
‘identity-protective cognition,’ the species of motivated reasoning
known to generate political polarization . . . .”46 However, if judges are
equipped to combat motivated reasoning, it does not necessarily follow
that judges have special advantages when called upon to identify
linguistic ambiguity. Some linguistic information simply may not be
available to the judge via introspection.
This is not to say that the use of language evidence from linguistic
corpora will eliminate the influence of cognitive biases in judicial
reasoning about interpretive questions. Corpus evidence requires
interpretation, analysis, and judgment. However, the evidence of
language use from a linguistic corpus can allow jurists to check their
intuitions about language usage and can allow the corpus user to verify
claims about language and meaning and make claims about language use
that are themselves verifiable or falsifiable.
2.

Dictionaries and the “Baffled Judge”

Faced with the daunting task of finding plain meaning in contractual
language, judges will often go “looking for comfortable reassurance” in
a dictionary47—what Justice Robert Jackson referred to as “the last
resort of the baffled judge.”48 The citation to dictionaries often goes
hand-in-glove with invocations of the Plain Meaning Rule. A prominent

42. Id.
43. Id. at 276.
44. Dan M. Kahan, et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of
Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 354 (2016).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. RANDOLPH QUIRK, STYLE AND COMMUNICATION IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 86 (1982).
48. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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treatise on New York contract law observes: “When interpreting a
contract, words and phrases used by the parties should be given their
plain meaning . . . . A dictionary can supply the common sense meaning
of words. It may be employed to determine the plain meaning of contract
terms.”49 While the treatise couches the use of dictionaries in
discretionary terms, dictionary use is not always a matter of judicial
discretion. Sometimes it is mandated by precedent and the failure to use
a dictionary can result in reversal. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. American
Legacy Foundation,50 the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a Chancery
Court opinion, holding:
[The] Vice Chancellor’s abandonment of all dictionaries and his
innovative review of how legal writers have used ordinary
words in their texts to ascertain the plain meaning of the words
are not supported by precedent. Under well-settled case law,
Delaware courts look to dictionaries for assistance in
determining the plain meaning of terms which are not defined in
a contract.51
The trouble is that dictionaries simply do not say which meanings are
plain in the context of a given contract. Dictionaries do not set out to
identify plain meaning. As the editors of the Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary expressly state, the dictionary “does not
evaluate senses or establish an enduring hierarchy of importance among
them. The best sense is the one that most aptly fits the context of an
actual genuine utterance.”52 As will be discussed more fully below,
linguistic corpora can give access to the contexts in which actual
genuine utterances occur in ways that dictionaries cannot.
Even if dictionary editors set out to provide the plain meaning of
contractual terms, it is not at all clear that they would be able to do so.
Dictionary editors cannot possibly anticipate the contexts in which a
given word will be used in a given contract.53 As Professors Hart and
Sacks observed in their influential Legal Process lectures: “A dictionary,
it is vital to observe, never says what meaning a word must bear in a

49. Glen Banks, 28 N.Y. PRAC., CONTRACT LAW § 9:6 (2018).
50. 903 A.2d 728, 738 (Del. 2006).
51. Id.
52. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 17a (1971) (emphasis added).
53. Rickie Sonpal, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2206
(2003) (“Dictionaries, by their very nature, do not provide the precise meaning of a word as it is
used in a particular context.”).
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particular context.”54 Dictionaries set out to document which meanings
are attested, not which meanings are plain or ordinary. Moreover,
dictionary making is a decidedly human endeavor. All but the most
recent dictionaries were produced with citation files that are liable to be
“unrepresentative of the language as a whole,” and reviewed by editors
who “all too often ignore common usages and give disproportionate
attention to uncommon ones . . . .”55
Dictionaries are not complete repositories of every sense in which a
given word has been used and every context in which a given word has
appeared. While lexicographers have estimated the total number of English
words at two million or more, “[e]ven the largest unabridged American
dictionaries contain well under half this total.”56 Moreover, “[a]bridged and
collegiate dictionaries include a smaller number of words and—more
relevant—they contain fewer and shorter definitions for these words.”57
And “all dictionaries must deal with space limitations that affect the usage
listings and amplifications contained in their definitions.”58
As demonstrated below, courts will sometimes attempt to bolster
claims about plain meaning by citing multiple dictionaries. But if
dictionaries do not contain the plain meaning of a given word in its
contractual context, then citing multiple dictionaries simply compounds
the problem. Moreover, it is not always clear that dictionaries have
arrived at their definitions independently—”[t]he history of English
lexicography usually consists of a recital of successive and often
successful acts of piracy.”59 This is because “[d]ictionary editors look at
each other’s books, and though editors form their own opinions about
what ground should be covered, they dare not depart too far from the
area laid out by their competitors.”60
54. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1190 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
55. SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 104 (2d ed.
2001); see also DOUGLAS BIBER ET AL., CORPUS LINGUISTICS: INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE
STRUCTURE AND USE 26 (1996) (“[C]itation slips represent only those contexts that a human reader
happens to notice (in some cases representing only the more unusual uses.”).
56. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for
Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 512 (2013); see also
Jean-Baptiste Michael et al., Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books,
331 SCI. 176, 177 (2011) (“This gap between dictionaries and the lexicon results from a balance that
every dictionary must strike: It must be comprehensive enough to be a useful reference but concise
enough to be printed, shipped, and used. As such, many infrequent words are omitted.”).
57. Brudney & Baum, supra note 56, at 512–13.
58. Id. at 513.
59. LANDAU, supra note 55, at 43.
60. Id. at 402.
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Sometimes courts will appeal to the ranking of senses in a dictionary,
claiming that a given sense should be given priority because it is listed
“first” in the dictionary.61 But the dictionaries most commonly relied
upon by judges do not rank their senses according to “plainness” or
“ordinariness,” and consequently such a reliance on a dictionary’s
ranking of senses is fallacious.62 And courts will sometimes arbitrarily
select a single sense from a dictionary as the plain meaning, while
ignoring a relevant competing sense.63
Courts have failed to adopt a principled basis for choosing between
legal dictionaries and general-use dictionaries.64 And courts have failed
to adopt a principled basis for selecting between prescriptive and
descriptive dictionaries.65
When attempting to account for historical usage, courts will
sometimes appeal to a dictionary published around the time the
document in question was executed. However, this practice, while
intuitively appealing has many drawbacks. The publication date of a
historical dictionary can be deceptive as some historical dictionaries
were merely reprinted with a new addition and were not updated to
reflect contemporary usage.66 Moreover, historical dictionaries may rely
on usage examples “composed centuries before the dictionary was
compiled.”67 And they may simply copy usage examples from prior
dictionaries.68 Courts have failed to adopt a principled standard for when
to use a historical dictionary.69 If interpreters are going to attempt to
learn about the linguistic conventions prevailing at the time a document
61. See Mouritsen, The Dictionary is Not a Fortress, supra note 13, at 1924–29 (discussing
problems with dictionary usage by courts and identifying the “sense-ranking fallacy”); see also
Brudney & Baum, supra note 56, at 514–15.
62. See Mouritsen, The Dictionary is Not a Fortress, supra note 13, at 1924–29 (discussing the
Sense Ranking Fallacy and noting that both the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary and
Oxford English Dictionary rank their senses historically, according to when a given sense first
appeared in the language); see also Brudney & Baum, supra note 56, at 514–15.
63. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274 (Utah 2015) (Lee, Associate C.J., concurring).
64. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 56, at 510.
65. Id. at 507.
66. See Sonpal, supra note 53, at 2209–10 (“[S]ome popular older dictionaries were not only
reprinted but even appeared in new editions without any substantive change to the body of the
dictionary . . . . Accordingly, judges who carefully choose the printing or edition of an old
dictionary . . . risk relying on a dictionary the substance of which far antecedes the statute.”).
67. Id. at 2207.
68. See Joseph W. Reed, Jr., Noah Websters Debt to Samuel Johnson, 37 AM. SPEECH 95
(1962) (noting that fully a third of Webster’s definitions were lifted verbatim or close to verbatim
from Johnson without attribution).
69. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 56, at 511.
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was executed, they will need a better source for historical usage than a
historical dictionary.
Indeed, because the information presented in dictionaries is more
complicated than judges sometimes recognize, Arthur L. Corbin urged
caution about drawing knee-jerk conclusions about plain meaning:
It is true that when a judge reads the words of a contract he may
jump to the instant and confident opinion that they have but one
reasonable meaning and that he knows what it is. A greater
familiarity with dictionaries and the usages of words, a better
understanding of the uncertainties of language, and a
comparative study of more cases in the field of interpretation,
will make one beware of holding such an opinion so recklessly
arrived at.70
This is not to suggest that dictionaries cannot be useful in the
interpretation of contracts. To begin with, judges and lawyers can use
dictionaries for their most obvious purpose—defining unknown terms.
Such a use of dictionaries is uncontroversial.71 Dictionaries may also be
used for purposes of attestation—to confirm that a contested sense of a
word has actually been used and recorded by lexicographers. In this
respect, unabridged dictionaries are “historical records . . . of the
meanings with which words have in fact been used by writers of good
repute. They are often useful in answering hard questions of whether, in
an appropriate context, a particular meaning is linguistically
permissible.”72 Dictionaries can give interpreters a sense of the range of
possible uses a given word may have had. And because judges and
lawyers are often called upon to describe fine nuances between senses,
dictionary definitions can model the way in which to describe these fine
differences in meaning. But dictionaries cannot tell their readers the
meaning a word must bear in the particular context of a given contract.
Corpus linguistics may offer a more nuanced and accurate picture of
language use than a dictionary-based approach to plain meaning. Corpus
linguistics is an evidence-based approach to the study of language that
70. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 535 (1952).
71. See Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use Dictionaries, 68 AM. SPEECH 50, 55 (1993) (“In
other cases, the dictionary is used to give the reader a general sense of the word, which seems to me
an appropriate use of the dictionary, whether or not it is necessary.”); Craig Hoffman, Parse the
Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary when Interpreting Legal Texts, 6
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 416 (2003) (“Definition is also used when the Court simply
does not know (or believes that the reader may not know) the accurate definition of a word that it is
using . . . . Needless to say, [this approach] is completely appropriate when ‘definition’ is the
Court’s sole objective.”).
72. See HART & SACKS, supra note 54, at 1375–76.
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involves the examination of language evidence assembled in large,
electronic collections of texts known as corpora.73 Corpus linguists draw
on this language evidence to make observations about the language
conventions of a given speech community, from a given timeframe,
spoken (or written) in a given context. 74 Using evidence from linguistic
corpora, judges and lawyers can learn to test their hypotheses about the
meaning of contractual language against the observable language
conventions from a given speech community. Where the speech
communities of the contracting parties differ, comparative corpus
evidence could be assembled to identify differences in the language use
of these communities. Such evidence-based observations allow the
corpus user to make informed judgments about the way that a given
word or phrase is used in a given context, in a given speech community,
and at a given time. Moreover, linguistic corpora are freely available and
can be accessed from any computer terminal.75 In addition, while the
analysis of corpus evidence still depends on human intuition and human
judgment, there is an important contrast with intuition-based judgments
about plain meaning in that the results of a corpus-based approach are
replicable and falsifiable.
II.

WHAT WE MEAN WHEN WE TALK ABOUT MEANING AND
CONTEXT

Courts agree that the meaning of the words of the contract must be
understood “in context.”76 But courts rarely identify what is meant when
contractual context is invoked. In contextualist jurisdictions (following
the Restatement), “context” may include extratextual background
information regarding “the subject matter of the transaction, preliminary
negotiations and statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course
73. SUSAN HUNSTON & DAVID OAKEY, INTRODUCING APPLIED LINGUISTICS 16 (2010) (“A
corpus is a large collection of language use, in the form of written texts or transcripts of speech,
usually stored on a computer and often designed to be a representation of the way a language is
used . . . [T]he object of study becomes the language system itself, rather than individual [language]
users’ intuitive knowledge of the language system . . . .”).
74. HANS LINDQUIST, CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE DESCRIPTION OF ENGLISH 1 (2010) (“[I]t
cannot be denied that corpus linguistics is also frequently associated with a certain outlook on
language. At the centre of this outlook is that the rules of language are usage-based and that changes
occur when speakers use language to communicate with each other.”).
75. The corpora relied upon for this paper are all freely available without a paid subscription
fee. See, e.g., CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH, https://www.englishcorpora.org/coca/ [https://perma.cc/C7E6-YJ6P].
76. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 740 (Del. 2006) (“A court
must accept and apply the plain meaning of an unambiguous term in the context of the contract
language and circumstances, insofar as the parties themselves would have agreed ex ante.”).
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of dealing between the parties.”77 But even contextualist courts appear to
recognize a separate category of linguistic context in which the text of
the agreement is situated and which serves as the most important
evidence of the parties’ intent.78 And formalist courts who closely adhere
to the Plain Meaning Rule similarly insist that such linguistic context is
essential to determining the meaning of a contractual provision.79
The question, then, is what do we mean when we talk about the
linguistic context of a contractual provision? This becomes a very
important question when attempting to evaluate the meaning of a
contractual provision based on evidence of language use. In so doing,
jurists may want to examine evidence of language use from contexts that
are similar to those that prevail in the relevant contractual provision.
This requires a meaningful way to account for the environment in which
the words of the contract are used.80
A.

Semantic, Syntactic, and Pragmatic Context

Context can encompass both verbal and non-verbal aspects of
communication.81 The verbal context in which a given contractual
provision occurs may include both its syntactic and semantic
environment. Syntax concerns itself with the way words are arranged in
a sentence to convey meaning.82 To understand the meaning of a word or
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 212 cmt. b.
78. People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 516, 526 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003) (“The language in a contract must be construed in the context of that instrument as a
whole.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 212 cmt. b. (“[A]fter
the transaction has been shown in all its length and breadth, the words of an integrated agreement
remain the most important evidence of intention.”).
79. See, e.g., Olson v. Kehoe Component Sales, Inc., 242 A.D. 2d 902, 903 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (“The agreement must be read in context and words must be given their ordinary and plain
meaning.”) (citations omitted); see also 7A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 3640 (West 2018) (“Where the language of a corporate charter instrument is
plain and clear, the court will not resort to extrinsic evidence in order to aid in interpretation, but
will enforce the contract in accordance with the plain meaning of its terms. The provision must be
read in context.”).
80. In this section, I will layout a framework for linguistic “context” for the interpretation of
contracts that is similar to the framework discussed in a prior article on statutory interpretation,
though I will add additional insights from the corpus literature here. Cf. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen
C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, YALE L. J. 788, 813–28 (2018).
81. Alessandro Duranti & Charles Goodwin, Rethinking Context: An Introduction, in
RETHINKING CONTEXT: LANGUAGE AS AN INTERACTIVE PHENOMENON 6–9 (Alessandro Duranti &
Charles Goodwin eds., 1992).
82. Syntax, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/196559?redirected
From=syntax#eid (last visited Aug. 7, 2019) (defining syntax as a “set of rules and principles in a language
according to which words, phrases, and clauses are arranged to create well-formed sentences.”). Syntax is
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phrase, interpreters should look for examples of the word or phrase in a
similar syntactic environment. Semantics is the study of meaning at the
word or phrase level.83 Words and phrases have embedded within them a
number of concepts (sometimes referred to as the semantic features or
semantic components of a word) that have bearing on meaning.84 A
usage-based evaluation of contractual meaning must endeavor to
evaluate usage evidence that shares semantic features with the word or
phrase in the contract.
If the goal is to evaluate meaning on the basis of language usage that
is similar to the language of the contract, insights about semantic
meaning from corpus linguistics can provide guideposts for the
collection of evidence. First, courts often assume that word forms with
the same base form (sometimes called a lemma) tend to have the same
meaning, regardless of how they are inflected (for example, whether
they appear in the singular or plural, or first, second, or third person
form).85 But this is not always the case. Some word forms have
markedly different meanings when employed with different inflections.
To illustrate, “[t]he forms moving and moved share some meanings with
move, but each form has a very distinctive pattern of meaning . . . In the
word moving for example there is the meaning of emotional affection,
which is quite prominent.”86 In evaluating usage evidence, interpreters
would look for evidence of usage of a given word or phrase with similar
inflection to that of the operative word in the contractual provision.
Second, courts may assume that the meaning of words is consistent
across parts of speech.87 But this is not always the case. Indeed, “a word
also concerns the study of these rules and principles. NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 11 (1957)
(“Syntax is the study of the principles and processes by which sentences are constructed in
particular languages.”).
83. MICHAEL MORRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 152 (2006)
(“Semantics is the attempt to give a systematic explanation of how the meaning of sentences
depends upon the meaning of their parts.”).
84. JOHN I. SAEED, SEMANTICS 260–65 (4th ed. 2016). These features include concepts like
number, animacy, gender, humanness, and concreteness (i.e., tangibleness). Id.
85. I use the word “inflection” throughout in its linguistic sense to mean “a : the change of form that
words undergo to mark such distinctions as those of case, gender, number, tense, person, mood, or voice[;]
b: a form, suffix, or element involved in such variation.” See Inflection, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inflection [https://perma.cc/CT2D-DEUZ].
86. JOHN SINCLAIR, TRUST THE TEXT: LANGUAGE, CORPUS AND DISCOURSE 17 (2004).
87. See, e.g., AT&T, Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 497 (3rd Cir. 2009) (“It would be very odd
indeed for an adjectival form of a defined term not to refer back to that defined term.”); Del. River
Stevedores v. DiFidelto, 440 F.3d 615, 623 (3d Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J., concurring) (stating that it is a
“grammatical imperative[]” that “a statute which defines a noun has thereby defined the adjectival
form of that noun” (emphasis added)). The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected this
“grammatical imperative” argument, holding: “Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of
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which can be used in more than one word class is likely to have
meanings associated specifically with each word class.”88 Thus, for
example, the word combat when used as a noun tends to be concerned
with the physical side of combat, while the verb combat tends to be
concerned with the social side.89 These separate meanings, which are
specific to a particular part of speech, can only be discovered by
examining evidence of the use of that part of speech in context.
Third, some information about word meaning and word usage is not
available via introspection. One example of linguistic information that is
unavailable via introspection is semantic prosody.90 “Words or phrases
are said to have a negative or positive semantic prosody if they typically
co-occur with [words] that have negative or positive meaning.”91
Consider the following list of words that most frequently co-occur with
the ostensibly neutral verb to happen.92 Nothing about the verb itself
suggests that it would have a positive or negative semantic prosody, but
it happens that happen more frequently collocates with negative
outcomes than positive ones.
Table 1:
Collocates of “Happen”
1
2

WHAT
SOMETHING

7
8

TERRIBLE
ACCIDENT

13
14

UNTHINKABLE
COINCIDE

corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct meanings of their own.” FCC
v. AT&T, 562 U.S. 397, 402 (2011).
88. See SINCLAIR, TRUST THE TEXT, supra note 86, at 18.
89. Id.; see also id. at 19 (“Each grammatical feature will probably correlate with just one
meaning, unless it is a very common word, or a word of very multifarious meaning, in which the
case the same grammar may apply to two or three meanings.”).
90. JOHN SINCLAIR, READING CONCORDANCES: AN INTRODUCTION 178 (2003) (“A corpus
enables us to see words grouping together to make special meanings that relate not so much to their
dictionary meanings as to the reasons why they were chosen together. This kind of meaning is
called semantic prosody.”); see also SUSAN HUNSTON & GILL FRANCIS, PATTERN GRAMMAR: A
CORPUS-DRIVEN APPROACH TO THE LEXICAL GRAMMAR OF ENGLISH 140 (2000) (listing examples
of semantic prosody and noting that “[i]f a collocation is chosen which is at odds with the usual
semantic set an ‘extra’ meaning will be implied which may convey irony or even insincerity”);
ALAN PARTINGTON, PATTERNS AND MEANINGS: USING CORPORA FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE
RESEARCH AND TEACHING 66–67 (1998) (discussing the negative semantic prosody of commit);
Justin Sytsma et al., Causal Attributions and Corpus Analysis, Methodological Advances,
EXPERIMENTAL PHIL. (2019) (discussing the negative semantic prosody of the verb cause).
91. TONY MCENERY & ANDREW HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THEORY AND
PRACTICE 136 (2012).
92. For details on how linguistic evidence reveals such co-occurrence, see the discussion of
“collocation,” see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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THINGS
NOTHING
WHATEVER
EXACTLY

9
10
11
12

WHATS
OVERNIGHT
ACCIDENTS
MIRACLES

15
16
17
18
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UNTOWARD
BENGHAZI
NATALEE
INSTANTANEOUSLY

While it is clear from these results that some miracles happen, so too
do accidents happen, the unthinkable happens; terrible, horrible,
untoward things happen.93 Thankfully, these collocates do not tell us
anything definitively gloomy about the nature of the universe, but they
do reveal something about the use of the verb happen that we likely
could not have discovered via introspection. Evaluating the meaning of
words in a contract may require access to evidence about the common
environments in which the words of a contract occur. Some of this
evidence cannot be found in a dictionary and cannot be gathered through
introspection.
Fourth, there must be a systematic way for gathering evidence of
usage because the choice of words by a competent English speaker does
not always constitute an independent selection.94 Word usage is highly
influenced by a process of co-selection, in which “the choice of one
word conditions the choice of the next, and of the next again.”95
Consider the sentence, “[t]he restaurant would not seat Mary’s party
because it was at [full] capacity.” This is a perfectly well-formed English
sentence that carries the same basic meaning whether or not the
bracketed word full is included. Full may appear in this or similar
sentences through the processes of co-selection and delexicalization,
discussed below.96 This feature of ordinary language use can have
important implications for an interpreter’s evaluation of the meaning of
an utterance.
Finally, an evidence-based approach to meaning should look for ways
to incorporate information about pragmatic context—which may include
93. On the COCA website: (1) Select “Collocates”; (2) Enter “happen_v” in the “Word/phrase”
field; (3) Enter an asterisk “*” (a wildcard) in the “Collocates” field; (4) Select “Sort/Limit” and set
the “Minimum” to “Mutual Info”; and (6) Click “Find collocates.” Corpus of Contemporary
American English, ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG, http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ [https://perma.cc/A5843SGA] [hereinafter COCA Website]. Throughout this Article, wherever language evidence from a
corpus is referenced, either a link or detailed instructions on how to exercise a given search will be
provided. Because the corpora relied upon for this Article are monitor corpora (corpora that are
routinely updated to reflect current usage), some variation in the co-occurrence information may be
expected.
94. SINCLAIR, TRUST THE TEXT, supra note 86, at 19.
95. Id.
96. See infra section IV.D.3.
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the physical or social setting of an utterance or other information that is
not encoded in the words themselves. These contexts will not always be
included in the text.97 However, some pragmatic information may be
recorded in the corpus and may be brought to bear on questions of Plain
Meaning.
B.

Plain Meaning and Historical Context

An evaluation of plain meaning ought to take into account the
possibility of language change. If the contract is very recent, then this
aspect of plain meaning becomes less important. But where the contract
at issue is an older instrument, a method that accounts for the temporal
dimension of interpretation is required. Consider the following four
definitions of car, listed in chronological order in the Oxford English
Dictionary:
1.a. A wheeled, usually horse-drawn conveyance; a carriage,
cart, or wagon.
2.a. The passenger compartment of a balloon, airship, cableway,
etc.; a gondola.
3.a. A railway carriage or wagon . . . .
4. motor car n.2. Now the usual sense.98
We can imagine that a contract governing the importation of cars, but
executed at a more distant point in history, would have a different
meaning. Courts often attempt to take into account the possibility of
language change by interpreting contracts according to the meaning of
the words in the contract at the time the contract was drafted.99 Human

97. See Duranti & Goodwin, supra note 81, at 6–9. Pragmatics includes concepts like
conversational implicature, where the meaning of an utterance is strongly implied but not expressly
stated—as where a spouse who says “there sure are a lot of dishes in the sink” is not just making an
observation about the state of the universe but is reminding somebody about whose turn it is to do
the dishes
98. See
Oxford
Univ.
Press,
Car,
OXFORD
ENG.
DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/27674?rskey=6D1tvb&result=1&isAdvanced=false (last visited
April 03, 2019).
99. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008, 1022 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Moore v. Stevens, 106 So. 901, 903 (Fla. 1925) (“[W]ords used must be given their
ordinary, obvious meaning as commonly understood at the time the instrument containing the
covenants was executed . . . .” (emphasis added)); Hartig Drug Co. v. Hartig, 602 N.W. 2d 794, 798
(Iowa 1999) (“[T]he words are given the meaning at the time the contract was executed.”); AIU Ins.
Co. v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal. 3d 807, 821 (1990) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636) (“Under statutory
rules of contract interpretation, the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed
governs interpretation.” (emphasis added)).
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language is constantly, naturally changing.100 But language change
doesn’t occur at a constant, predictable rate, and methods of
interpretation need a meaningful way to account for such changes.101
One way to do this is with language evidence from the relevant
timeframe.
C.

Meaning and Speech Community

Finally, evaluation of contractual meaning should take into account
the possibility of differences in the linguistic conventions of different
speech communities involved in contract drafting.102 It is not difficult to
imagine contract cases in which differing linguistic conventions of the
different communities involved in drafting the contract might lead to
different understandings of the same contractual language. Some
contracts are executed between sophisticated commercial parties, with
specialized knowledge of both contracting conventions of a particular
industry and the characteristics of the underlying industry itself. Other
contracts are more public-facing and are executed between firms and
their customers. Some such differences are anticipated by interpretive
rules in the context of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), where
variations in trade usage are taken into account.103 In such cases, where
the question is whether competing industries, different geographical
100. JOHN LYONS, INTRODUCTION TO THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS 43 (1968) (“All languages
are subject to constant change. This is an empirical fact . . . . All living languages . . . are of their
nature efficient and viable systems of communication serving the different and multifarious social
needs of the communities that use them.”).
101. TERRY CROWLEY & CLAIRE BOWERN, AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS
149–51 (2011) (discussing criticisms of attempts to quantify the rate of language change); LYLE
CAMPELL, HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS 201 (2d ed. 2004) (Glottochronology, a theory attempting to
account for the rate of language change “has proven particularly misleading and it is important to
understand why it should be avoided. . . . [I]t is important to understand why it does not work for
subgrouping, or for any other purpose, for that matter.” (emphasis added)).
102. See, e.g., MARCYLIENA H. MORGAN, SPEECH COMMUNITIES: KEY TOPICS IN LINGUISTIC
ANTHROPOLOGY 1 (2014) (“Speech communities are groups that share values and attitudes about
language use, varieties and practices. These communities develop through prolonged interaction
among those who operate within these shared and recognized beliefs and value systems regarding
forms and styles of communication.”); Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into
Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1154 (1983) (defining speech community as the
“group of people who share a common language (or sublanguage) and thus a common culture (or
subculture), which in turn defines the context that conditions the utterances that occur within it.”)
Kamal K. Sridhar, Societal Multilingualism, in SOCIOLINGUISTICS AND LANGUAGE TEACHING 47,
49 (Sandra Lee McKay & Nancy H. Hornberger eds., 1996) (“A conglomeration of individuals who
share the[] same norms about communication is referred to as a speech community. A speech
community is defined as a community sharing a knowledge of the rules for the conduct and
interpretation of speech.”).
103. See U.C.C. § 1-303 (defining “usage of trade”).
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regions, lawyers or their clients, or sophisticated and unsophisticated
parties use a given term differently, we might look to evidence of
comparative usage in order to evaluate the plain meaning of contractual
language.
III. A CORPUS-BASED APPROACH TO PLAIN MEANING
Corpus linguistics is a tool that can assist judges and lawyers in
evaluating claims about meaning and ambiguity in a contract. Corpus
linguistics can be understood as “the study of language data on a large
scale—the computer-aided analysis of very extensive collections of
transcribed utterances or written texts.”104 It is premised “on the idea that
the description of the language cannot be made just from the intuition of
the linguist, but that it requires the handling of a set of real language
samples.”105 Linguistic corpora are typically comprised of samples of
natural language—written text and transcribed speech that were
produced in a natural setting (and collected after the fact by a corpus
architect) rather than speech or text that are gathered through traditional
methods of elicitation, like surveys, interviews, or observation.106
Linguistic corpora are collections of digitized texts that are often
annotated (or tagged) with additional grammatical information (or
metadata) to facilitate the study of language.107 In virtually every
circumstance where technology and language cross paths—in machine
translation, speech recognition, or language pedagogy—linguistic
corpora are used to provide objective and accurate information about the

104. MCENERY & HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra
note 91, at i.
105. Francisco Moreno-Fernández, Corpora of Spoken Spanish Language—The
Representativeness Issue, in LINGUISTIC INFORMATICS STATE OF THE ART AND THE FUTURE 120
(Yuji Kawaguchi et al. eds., 2005); see also David Oakey, English Vocabulary and Collocation, in
SUSAN HUNSTON & DAVID OAKEY, INTRODUCING APPLIED LINGUISTICS 16 (2009) (“A corpus is a
large collection of language use, in the form of written texts or transcripts of speech, usually stored
on a computer and often designed to be a representation of the way a language is used. . . . [T]he
object of study becomes the language system itself, rather than individual [language] users’ intuitive
knowledge of the language system . . . .”); JAMES SIMPSON, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
APPLIED LINGUISTICS 597 (2011) (“At the heart of empirically based linguistics and data-driven
description of language, corpus linguistics is concerned with language use in real contexts.”);
ELENA TOGNINI-BONELLI, CORPUS LINGUISTICS AT WORK 1 (2001) (“[I]t cannot be denied that
corpus linguistics is also frequently associated with a certain outlook on language. At the centre of
this outlook is that the rules of language are usage-based and that changes occur when speakers use
language to communicate with each other.”).
106. ANNE O’KEEFE & MICHAEL MCCARTHY, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPUS
LINGUISTICS 303 (2010).
107. Id. at 433.
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linguistic conventions of the speech community in question.108
Contemporary lexicographers use corpora to provide objective and
accurate information about the way in which words are used.109 And
because sophisticated linguistic corpora are freely available to anyone
with access to a computer and an internet connection,110 the same type of
evidence used by contemporary lexicographers to draft dictionaries is
now available to anyone interested in gathering objective evidence about
language use.
Linguistic corpora are designed to be “maximally representative finite
sample[s]” of language use, which “enable[] results to be quantified and
compared to other results in the same way as any other scientific
investigation which is based on a data sample.”111
[T]he distinctive characteristic of corpus linguistics is the claim
that it is possible to actually ‘represent’ a domain of language
use with a corpus of texts, and possible to empirically describe
linguistic patterns of use through analysis of that corpus. Any
research question relating to linguistic variation and use can be
approached from this methodological perspective.112
While corpus linguistics follows in a long tradition of using empirical
linguistic evidence to understand human language (in fields such as field
linguistics and lexicography),113 the emergence of corpus linguistics as a
separate discipline is fairly recent and has moved in tandem with the rise
of the personal computer.114 The exponential growth in computing
108. See, e.g., id. at 102, 513.
109. See, e.g., OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH xi (3d ed. 2010) (“The general principle on
which the senses in the Oxford Dictionary of English are organized is that each word or part of
speech has at least one core sense or core meaning, to which a number of subsenses may be
attached . . . Core meanings represent typical, central uses of the word in question in modern
standard English, as established by analysis of the Oxford English Corpus and our other language
databases.”). Note that while some recent, contemporary dictionaries rely on linguistic corpora in
their construction, many of the dictionaries most commonly cited by courts—including WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL, WEBSTER’S SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, and THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), see infra note 215, were developed prior to the
emergence of large-scale sophisticated corpora and have not relied upon linguistic corpora in their
construction. And even where the lexicographer uses corpora to prepare a dictionary, the dictionary
itself, with limitations of space and coverage cannot anticipate every specific context in which a
word is used.
110. See, e.g., NOW CORPUS, https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/ [https://perma.cc/4BEJ-3EKM].
111. TONY MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 75 (2011).
112. DOUGLAS BIBER & RANDI REPPEN, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ENGLISH CORPUS
LINGUISTICS 1 (2015).
113. O’KEEFE & MCCARTHY, supra note 106, at 15 (discussing the relationship among corpus
linguistics, lexicography and field linguistics).
114. See TOGNINI-BONELLI, supra note 105, at 5.
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power and the increase in the availability of computers to individual
users has resulted in the concomitant increase in size, availability, and
sophistication of linguistic corpora.115 Today, corpus linguistics allows
for real-time examination of “a quantity of information that could hardly
be envisaged by a team of informants working over decades even 50
years ago . . . .”116
“Empiricism lies at the core of corpus linguistics . . . .”117 The
promise of corpus linguistics is that the corpus—like many other
instruments of scientific observation and discovery—can reveal facts
about the natural world that cannot be perceived through ordinary means
of human perception.118 Corpus linguists test their hypotheses about
language through rigorous observation with evidence that only a corpus
can render observable and quantifiable. And, importantly, the results of
any such corpus-based experiment can also be rendered replicable and
falsifiable.119
Linguistic corpora may vary widely in terms of size, design, and
purpose.120 They can be tailored to represent the linguistic behavior of a
particular speech community or linguistic register.121 And corpora can be
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. MCENERY & HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra
note 91, at 49; PAUL BAKER, GLOSSARY OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 65 (2006) (“In linguistics,
empiricism is the idea that the best way to find out about how language works is by analyzing real
examples of language as it is actually used. Corpus linguistics is therefore a strongly empirical
methodology.”).
118. Writing about the Google Books N-Gram Viewer, a corpus constructed from the contents
of Google Books, Jean-Baptiste Michel et al. commented: “The corpus cannot be read by a human.
If you tried to read only English-language entries from the year 2000 alone, at the reasonable pace
of 200 words/min, without interruptions for food or sleep, it would take 80 years. The sequence of
letters is 1000 times longer than the human genome: If you wrote it out in a straight line, it would
reach to the Moon and back 10 times over.” See Michael et al., supra note 56, at 176.
119. MCENERY & HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra
note 91, at 66 (“As a key goal of corpus linguistics is to aim for replicability of results, data creators
have an important duty to discharge in ensuring that the data they produce is made available to
analysts in the future.”).
120. For further discussion of the types of linguistic corpora and the tools they offer, see
Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, YALE L.J. 788 (2018).
121. A register is “any of the varieties of a language that a speaker uses in a particular social
context.” Register, MERRIAM Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/register
[https://perma.cc/6C8U-JCAH] (last visited Sept. 1, 2019); see Lawrence M. Solan, The New
Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2059 (2005) (“When the legal system decides to
rely on the ordinary meaning of a word, it must also determine which interpretive community’s
understanding it wishes to adopt. This choice is made tacitly in legal analysis, but becomes overt
when the analysis involves linguistic corpora because the software displays the issue on a screen in
front of the researcher.” (emphasis added)).
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constructed to represent language use from any point in history for
which there are surviving texts.
Corpora can provide objective evidence of how frequently different
words occur in particular semantic environments122 through a process
called collocation. “Collocation is the co-occurrence of words with a
frequency that is much higher than it would be by chance.”123 Courts
frequently interpret contractual terms according to the context in which
they occur. Collocation can give us a sense of the scope of that context
that is not available through introspection. One way collocation does this
is by displaying semantic prosody, as discussed above.
Another important feature of a linguistic corpus is the concordance or
key word in context (KWIC) function. “A concordance is a collection of
the occurrences of a word-form, each in its own textual environment. In
its simplest form it is an index. Each word-form is indexed and a
reference is given to a place of occurrence in a text.”124 A concordance
allows its user to review a particular word or word form in hundreds of
contexts, all on the same page of running text.125 This allows a corpus
user to evaluate words in context systematically, a task that, again,
cannot be performed using intuition.
Corpus evidence can be brought to bear to evaluate claims of plain
meaning or ambiguity of the contractual provisions, as illustrated below.
The primary source for language evidence discussed below126 is the
Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA). The COCA is “the
only large, and genre-balanced corpus of American English.”127 “The
corpus contains more than 560 million words of text (20 million words
each year 1990-2017) and it is equally divided among spoken, fiction,
popular magazines, newspapers, and academic texts.”128 The COCA is a
monitor corpus that is occasionally updated to reflected usage.129

122. See MCENERY & WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 111, at
82.
123. O’KEEFE & MCCARTHY, supra note 106, at 435; see also SUSAN HUNSTON, CORPORA IN
APPLIED LINGUISTICS 68 (2002).
124. O’KEEFE & MCCARTHY, supra note 106, at 167 (quoting JOHN M. SINCLAIR, CORPUS,
CONCORDANCE, COLLOCATION, 32 (1991)).
125. See infra note 169 for instructions on viewing a concordance display.
126. See infra Part IV.
127. See CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH, https://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ (last
visited Sept. 14, 2017).
128. Id.
129. O’KEEFE & MCCARTHY, supra note 106, at 110 (discussing the features of the COCA);
see also id. at 430 (defining monitor corpus).
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By contrast, one of the contracts at issue below130 was executed in
1961. If we are to correctly assess the linguistic conventions prevailing
during that period, we need usage evidence from that time period. The
Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) has evidence from that
time period. The COHA is “the largest structured corpus of historical
English.”131 It contains “more than 400 million words of text from the
1810s-2000s (which makes it 50–100 times as large as other comparable
historical corpora of English) and the corpus is balanced by genre
decade by decade.”132
Using evidence from the written portions of the COCA and the
COHA, we can gather information about the linguistic conventions of
Standard American English for the time periods in question.133 But it is
not necessarily obvious that Standard American English is the
appropriate speech register for the interpretation of all contracts. In the
problems addressed below,134 the courts and the parties turned to
unabridged, general-use dictionaries in order to define the operative
terms. This suggests that in assessing plain meaning and ambiguity,
courts often have a notion of Standard American English in mind when
performing interpretive tasks. Moreover, two of the problems below
address contract interpretation issues in the insurance context, in which
courts often resolve ambiguities against the drafting party and in favor of
the insured.135 When a court attempts to determine the meaning of a
contract drafted by a national or multi-national insurance company and
entered into by insureds from a variety of locations within the United
States, the court may decide to attempt to interpret the contract
according to the shared linguistic conventions of a nationwide speech
community. Such an interpretive approach may suggest that some notion
of Standard American English might be relevant to the resolution of

130. See infra Part IV.C.
131. CORPUS OF HISTORICAL AMERICAN ENGLISH, BYU.EDU, http://corpus.byu.edu/coha
[https://perma.cc/4SJ2-SQMC].
132. Id.
133. WALT WOLFRAM & NATALIE SCHILLING, AMERICAN ENGLISH: DIALECTS AND
VARIATION 410 (2015) (defining “Standard American English” as a variety of English that is “held
to be the linguistic norm and that is relatively unmarked with respect to regional characteristics of
English.”).
134. See infra Part IV.
135. See infra section IV.A. (Problem No. 1); infra section IV.B. (Problem No. 2). Linguist
Goffrey Nunberg observed that the American Heritage Dictionary’s usage panel “merely reflected
the predominant practices of Standard English,” which he defined as “the variety that happens to
have been adopted by the educated middle-classes . . . .” LANDAU, supra note 55, at 248.

16 - Mouritsen (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

10/21/2019 7:41 PM

CORPUS-BASED CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

1365

some interpretive problems in insurance contexts.136 However, as we
will see (and as we might expect), some contractual language reflects
specialized legal or industrial usage, and there may be instances when a
specialized corpus of legal texts or contracts from a given industry and
time period may be necessary to properly address the relevant
interpretive questions.
IV. THE CORPUS APPROACH TO PLAIN-MEANING IN
PRACTICE
This section will examine a collection of four contract cases, in which
courts were faced with difficult interpretive questions. This section will
demonstrate some of the language evidence that linguistic corpora can
provide, as well as some of the questions posed by the availability of the
evidence corpora provide.
A.

Problem No. 1: Plain Meaning and “Snorkeling”

An insured ecological tourism company sued its Insurer for refusing
to defend or indemnify the Insured in a negligence action arising from
customer’s drowning death while snorkeling.137 The policy at issue,
drafted in 2004, states, “[T]his insurance does not apply to ‘bodily
injury’ [including death] to any person while practicing for or
participating in any sports or athletic contest or exhibition that you
sponsor.”138
Question: Is snorkeling a sport?
The Insurer sought summary judgment, arguing that snorkeling is a
sport and therefore the death of the Insured’s customer was subject to the
exclusion.139 The court disagreed and invoked the Plain Meaning Rule,

136. In addition, Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott have argued that commercial
parties may benefit from a default rule that enshrines interpretation according to Standard Written
American English, which is roughly analogous to what they term “majority talk.” Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 570 (2003).
“[M]ajority talk” is defined as “the language that people typically use when communicating with
each other.” Id. Schwartz and Scott advocate the default rule in favor of “majority talk” for
commercial parties “because the default would (1) reduce contracting costs, (2) minimize the
opportunities for strategic behavior, (3) reduce the risk of judicial error, and (4) expand the set of
efficient contracts that parties could write.” Id. at 584.
137. Hawaiian Isle Adventures, Inc. v. North Am. Capacity Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 2d 1189,
1993 (D. Haw. 2009).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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noting that “it is not clear that snorkeling falls within the plain meaning
of ‘sports.’”140
1.

Dictionaries and the Plain Meaning of “Sport”

The court found that the plain meaning of sport excluded snorkeling.
Turning to dictionary definitions of sport, the court observed that sport is
“defined by Webster’s as ‘an activity [that gives enjoyment or
recreation], especially when competitive, requiring more or less vigorous
bodily exertion and carried on, sometimes as a profession, according to
some traditional form or set of rules.’”141 The court also cites the
American Heritage Dictionary, which defines sport as “physical activity
that is governed by a set of rules or customs and often engaged in
competitively.”142 The court then concludes the insurer “does not even
suggest that snorkeling is governed by any traditional set of rules or
customs, as provided by the dictionary definitions.”143 Based on these
dictionary citations, the court concludes that the “rule-based athletic
competition” sense of sport is the term’s plain meaning.144
The court’s dictionary-based reasoning is highly suspect. To begin
with, the court refers to Webster’s dictionary as if it were a single,
unitary book. In fact, there are three American publishers that publish a
dictionary (or suite of dictionaries) under the name Webster’s—
Houghton Mifflin Company, Random House, and Merriam-Webster,
Inc. The use of the Webster name for dictionaries has been in the public
domain since 1908.145 While this offhand reference to Webster’s may

140. Id. at 1197.
141. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1297 (3d ed. 1997)).
142. Id. (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1680 (4th ed. 2006)).
143. Id. at 1198. The court also makes a grammatical argument, noting “sports” in the “any
sports or athletic contest or exhibition that you sponsor” may be functioning as a nominal adjective
of “contest or exhibition” and observes that “if ‘sports’ is an adjective modifying ‘contest’ and/or
‘exhibition,’ the Athletic Exclusion is clearly inapplicable.” Id. at 1197. Because the court is ruling
on the insurer’s summary judgment motion (a motion for which the insurer bears the burden of
proof), the court does not affirmatively rule that sports is an adjective or a noun in this context. And
the court cites precedent suggesting that such a construction is ambiguous regardless. Id. (citing
Garcia v. St. Bernard Par. Sch. Bd., 576 So.2d 975, 976 (La. 1991)). In Garcia, the Louisiana State
Supreme Court repeatedly reads a similar provision as applying to a “sports contest,” and still finds
the provision to be ambiguous. Garcia, 567 So.2d at 976–77.
144. Hawaiian Isle Adventures, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d at 1197.
145. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Ogilvie, 159 F. 638, 640 (1st Cir. 1908) (holding that “[t]he
statutory monopoly having expired under statutory limitation, the word ‘Webster’ used in
connection with a dictionary, became public property, and any relief granted upon the idea of title or
proprietorship in the trade-name of ‘Webster’ would necessarily involve an unwarrantable
continuance of the statutory monopoly secured by the copyright.”); see also Merriam-Webster, Inc.
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not have any great impact on the court’s analysis, it is indicative of the
abstract way in which courts sometimes think about dictionaries. As
Professor Lawrence Solan has observed, “we commonly ignore the fact
that someone sat there and wrote the dictionary which is on our desk,
and we speak as though there were only one dictionary, whose
lexicographer got all the definitions ‘right’ in some sense that defies
analysis.”146
While there is not a single Webster’s dictionary that got all the
answers right in some abstract sense, there is one thing that all three
Webster’s dictionaries have in common (aside from their name): they all
define sport as both a competitive activity (“a game or contest esp. when
involving individual skill or physical prowess on which money is
staked”) and a physical activity that is “a pleasing or amusing pastime or
activity: recreation.”147 The same thing is true for the American Heritage
Dictionary, which defines sport as both “[a]n activity involving physical
exertion and skill that is governed by a set of rules or customs and often
undertaken competitively,” and as “a usually challenging activity
undertaken for amusement.”148 Both of these competing senses of sport
are attested in common usage.149 The court never justifies the choice
between these two senses, nor the basis for selecting one set of
dictionary definitions and ignoring the other set.

v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding the terms “Webster’s” and
“collegiate” to be generic with respect to dictionaries).
146. Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use Dictionaries, 68 AM. SPEECH 50, 50 (1993).
147. Sport, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2206 (1975) (defining sport
as “a source of diversion,” “recreation” . . . ”physical activity engaged in for pleasure,” “a particular
activity (such as an athletic game) so engaged in”); see also THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: THE UNABRIDGED EDITION (1994); WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 1297 (3d ed. 1997).
148. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1680 (4th ed. 2006).
149. It is easy to generate examples of the rule-based competition notion of sport. The sports
page of any newspaper provides a variety of examples. A search in a newspaper archive reveals a
variety of instances in which sport is used to describe snorkeling. Lottie Bogan, Challenge Met With
a Splash, THE NORTHSIDE SUN (JACKSON MISSISSIPPI), Mar. 18, 2004, at 5C (“On our day in Saint
Thomas, my daughter-in-law Gail and I decided to go snorkeling, a sport I have enjoyed in the
past.”); Patricia Farrell, Explore by Snorkel, BOY’S LIFE, Aug. 1978, at 20 (“Snorkeling is a sport
you can enjoy for itself or as practice for the day you can do deep dives with air tanks and scuba
equipment.”); Alison S. Wellner, AMERICANS AT PLAY: DEMOGRAPHICS OF OUTDOOR RECREATION
& TRAVEL 217 (1997) (“Snorkeling is a sport that can be enjoyed even at older ages . . . .”).
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Prototype, Family Resemblance, and the Plain Meaning of “Sport”

Like many questions of legal interpretation, the question of whether
snorkeling is a sport is deceptively simple. But, as Corbin cautioned,150
we should be skeptical of knee-jerk responses (especially our own kneejerk responses) to such questions—these questions often prove more
difficult and more nuanced than they seem on first impression. Indeed,
the question, “what is a sport?” (and the related question, “what is a
game?”) have played an important role in foundational texts of both the
philosophy of language and cognitive linguistics.
In his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations, language
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein stated,
Consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games’. I
mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games,
and so on. What is common to them all? . . . In ball games there
is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the
wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. . . . Think
now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of
amusement, but how many other characteristic features have
disappeared! . . . And the result of this examination is: we see a
complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities
of detail . . . . I can think of no better expression to characterize
these similarities than ‘family resemblances’ . . . .151
Wittgenstein’s argument is that “the extension of a concept [like a
game] may be united not by common characteristics but by overlapping
similarities between the members.”152 And he attempts to show that our
use of general terms can only proceed because “overlapping similarities
or resemblances between the instances exist rather than a unique set of
characteristic marks that they all share.”153
The court’s notion of sport as a rule-based athletic competition and
the insurer’s preferred sense of physical activity for recreation
potentially share a number of features. Both involve physical exertion.
Both take place (sometimes, if not often) out of doors. Both can be
undertaken for recreation. But, of course, they have a number of

150. See supra note 70, at 496–97.
151. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, 31e–32e (G.E.M. Anscombe
et al., trans., 2d ed. 1958).
152. THOMAS MCNALLY, WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: THE LEGACY
OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 28 (2017).
153. Id.
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differences. Wittgenstein reminds us that it is not always easy to make
fine distinctions about which terms fall into a category and which do not.
Nor is it always possible to list a series of necessary and sufficient
conditions that will describe everything that ought to be considered a
sport, but that will exclude everything that is not a sport.
Another way to conceptualize the question of the plain meaning of
sport is through the linguistic concept of prototype. A prototype can be
understood as “the best example of a category.”154 A robin may a
prototypical bird; a chair may be a prototypical piece of furniture. In a
landmark paper in the field of cognitive linguistics,155 Eleanor Rosch
conducted a series of experiments that revealed, among other things, that
the human notion of concepts “appear to be represented in cognition not
as a set of criterial features with clear-cut boundaries but rather in terms
of prototype (the clearest cases, best examples) of the category.”156
Rosch’s methodology involved ranking experiments in which 209
survey subjects were asked to rate, on a seven-point scale, which words
were “good examples” of one of ten categorical terms.157 The results of
the study showed “a high agreement between subjects concerning these
rankings.”158 Thus, chair is a more prototypical example of furniture
than footstool,159 automobile is a more prototypical vehicle than yacht,160
and robin is a more prototypical bird than ostrich.161 The categories
Rosch examined included fruit, vehicle, weapon, vegetable, carpenter’s
tool, bird, toy, clothing, and, importantly for our purposes, sport.162 As
with the other categories examined, Rosch’s data showed that some
activities are “better examples” of sport than others. Rosch’s respondents
ranked the following activities from most sport-like to least sport-like:
Football, baseball, basketball, tennis, softball, canoeing,
handball, rugby, hockey, ice hockey, swimming, track, boxing,
volleyball, lacrosse, skiing, golf, polo, surfing, wrestling,
gymnastics, cricket, squash, badminton, racing, pole vault,
fencing, bowling, water skiing, ice skating, jai alai, skating,
154. WILLIAM CROFT & ALAN CRUSE, COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 87 (2004).
155. Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representation of Semantic Categories, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 192, 193 (1975).
156. See id. at 193.
157. Id. at 198, 229–33.
158. Id. at 198.
159. Id. at 229.
160. Id. at 230.
161. Id. at 232.
162. Id.
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skydiving, sailing, diving, archery, judo, car racing, ping pong,
rowing, fishing, horseback riding, running, horse racing, hiking,
weight lifting, croquet, horseshoes, boating, pool, billiards,
hunting, jump rope, camping, chess, dancing, checkers, cards,
sunbathing.163
Of the ten most prototypical sports in Rosch’s study, only one,
canoeing,164 appears to fit within the more narrow confines of the
recreational physical activity sense of sport. However, several other
recreational activities are rated more sport-like than their rule-based
counterparts—for example, sky diving is ranked more sport-like than
judo, and fishing is ranked over horse racing, croquet, and horseshoes.165
At least some scholars have argued that when judges search for plain
meaning, they are sometimes searching for linguistic prototypes.166
While Rosch’s article suggests the physical recreation notion is
represented in our concept of sport (as many such sports rank above their
rule-based counterparts), the article also makes clear that the rule-based
competition notion of sport predominates. To the extent that we believe
our search for plain meaning is a search for prototype only, we could
view Rosch’s data as evidence that snorkeling does not come within the
plain meaning of sport. Alternatively, we might rely on Wittgenstein’s
reasoning above to conclude that there is no set of necessary and
sufficient conditions which can definitively describe everything that is a
163. Id. at 200–01, tbl.1.
164. Like many of the more or less sport-like activities ranked in Rosch’s study, canoeing can
be both a recreational activity and a rule-based completion. See Canoe Sprint, OLYMPIC.ORG,
https://www.olympic.org/canoe-sprint [https://perma.cc/NP7F-JSPP]. However, as will be shown
below, an examination of usage demonstrates that canoeing is most often used with reference to
recreational activities.
165. One obvious response to this data is to assume that prototypicality judgments are a mere
reflection of the frequency with which these sports (or references to them) are encountered in
common speech. After all, it is not hard to imagine that a collection of American test subjects would
name football, baseball, and basketball as the most prototypical sports. But if that were the case, we
would have to accept that the respondents in Rosch’s study had more experience with (or exposure
to) judo than they did with fishing, and running. This seems unlikely. Judgments about
prototypicality do not predictably map on to measures of statistical frequency. See John R. Taylor,
Prototype Theory, in 1 SEMANTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE MEANING 649–
50 (Claudia Maienborn et al. eds. 2011) (“[M]any people are inclined to say that prototypes (or
prototypical instances) are encountered more frequently than more marginal examples and that that
is what makes the prototypical. [This] cannot be the whole story.”).
166. See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 67–68
(1998) (“In the realm of statutory interpretation, judges often evoke the canon that they are to give
words in a statute their ‘ordinary’ meaning. Prototype analysis tells us that the notion of ordinary
meaning has a cognitive basis.”); see also Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson,
False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1276–80 (2008);
Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2042–46 (2005).

16 - Mouritsen (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

CORPUS-BASED CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

10/21/2019 7:41 PM

1371

sport and exclude everything that isn’t. Because snorkeling bears a
“family resemblance” to some, but not all, sport-like concepts (it takes
place out of doors, involves physical exertion, is undertaken for
recreation), it comes within the plain meaning of sport. We might also
conclude that because snorkeling as sport is at the very least an attested
use of the word sport, the recreational activity reading of sport is a
possible reading of the word and, as such, the contract is ambiguous and
should be interpreted against the drafter. Each of these approaches is a
plausible way of thinking about the plain meaning of sport, but courts
have not yet decided what they mean when they invoke the plain
meaning canon or when they identify contractual ambiguity.167
3.

Linguistic Corpora and the Meaning of “Sport”

Rather than arbitrarily selecting among competing dictionary
definitions of sport, linguistic corpora can demonstrate the range of
potential meanings of sport. We begin with collocation. Collocation data
can be used to get a general sense of the range of possible uses of the
term sport. Because the general liability policy at issue in Problem No. 1
was executed in 2004, we will rely on collocation data from the
COCA.168 The fifty most common collocates of sport are listed in the
COCA as follows:
usa, professional, illustrated, teams, utility, fox, fans, pro,
entertainment, marketing, complex, youth, olympic, medicine, o,
athletes, bar, writer, authority, vehicles, soccer, vehicle, nbc,
cbs, betting, arena, fan, section, columnist, bureau, elias, espn,
leagues, motor, fame, tennis, utilities, franchises, gambling,
governing, swimming, franchise, fitness, camps, memorabilia,
extreme, coupe, venues, coat, volleyball.
There are a number of collocates of sport that suggest the rule-based
athletic competition sense. These include straightforward instances of
such rule-based athletic competitions like soccer, tennis, and volleyball.
They also include collocates that strongly suggest a rule-based
competition context, including Olympic, athletes, and franchises. In
addition, while it is certainly possible that sports coverage on major
networks would include a feature on snorkeling, it seems likely that
167. See supra notes 23–30.
168. On the COCA website: (1) Select “Collocates”; (2) Enter “SPORT_n” in the
“Word/phrase” field (capitalization makes the search lemmatized—assuring that we find all
inflections of the word; the “_n” is to limit the search noun forms); (3) Enter an asterisk “*” (a
wildcard) in the “Collocates” field; (4) Select “Sort/Limit” and set the “Minimum” to “Mutual
Info”; and (5) Click “Find collocates.” COCA Website, supra note 93.
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those tuning into sports coverage on FOX, NBC, CBS, and ESPN are
looking for coverage of rule-based competition. These collocation
results appear to track the findings of the Rosch study referenced above.
The collocate data give us the initial impression that the prototype of
sport in the Rosch study matches the way in which the word appears to
be most frequently used. A corpus user can confirm these predictions by
examining the use of sport in context, using the concordance (or KWIC)
function of the corpus.169
Table 2:
“Sport” in the COCA170

television has driven

sports

the IOC says the channel
would promote Olympic

sports

win. Despite the
performance, finding a
footing in the

sport

rooting him on to his
eighth gold. The
who owes his vast
fortune to Andy Griffith
reruns and
Like the rest of Cuban
society, the nation’s powerful
with some family
members not to exchange
gifts. Lessons and
Edge Magazine, a
skateboarding publication.
Before, the

sport
sports
sports
sports
sport

for decades, and
European soccer has the
type of audience
in the years between the
games
of MMA was tough.
Wanting to have a
consistent training
regimen
of swimming has come a
long way
on television. Turner
signed pitcher Andy
Messersmith, one of
apparatus has been hit by
the economic hard times
that have
are another major
expense. Fees for
Kelcee’s gymnastics
has been just a bunch of
loud-mouthed people
trying to get

169. To view the concordance lines for sport: (1) Select “KWIC” on the COCA homepage; (2)
Enter “SPORT_n” in the “Word/phrase” field; (3) Select “Sections” and select “MAGAZINE” and
“NEWSPAPER”; (4) Click “Keyword in Context (KWIC).” Id.
170. These concordance lines are selected for illustration purposes. A complete sample of
concordance lines for sport can be viewed using the instructions in supra note 169.
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Roller derby wasn’t like
any other

sport

With Olympic
recognition, can kayaking as
a spectator

sport

1373

to me because it showed
how all those bad-assed
women could be
be far behind? Last year
the world championships
for

Per my analysis of the 100 concordance lines examined, half featured
uses of sport that explicitly referenced a rule-based athletic competition
sense. Many of the other concordance lines strongly suggested a context
in which rule-based athletic competition made the most sense, including
references to the sports page, or sports betting or sports gambling, and
there were a handful of references to the magazine Sports Illustrated. A
dozen concordance lines had entirely unrelated uses of sport, including
sport car or sport jacket. A small percentage of the uses of sport were
ambiguous.
There were only three references to sports that might qualify as
physical recreation rather than rule-based competition. Each of the
following was described as a sport and could plausibly fall within either
sense: kayaking, skateboarding, and bungee jumping. In the case of both
kayaking and skateboarding, however, the expanded context shows that
these concordance lines were taken from articles discussing the
evolution of each sport from a recreational activity to a rule-based
competition. Such uses of sport make clear that the word has a range of
meanings that we have already seen listed about in a number of
dictionaries. Out of one hundred concordance lines examined, only one
has reference to an unambiguous use of the recreational activity use of
sport. One article in the corpus discusses the rise of the recreational,
non-competitive sport of bungee jumping.
Here, the rule-based competition sense overwhelmingly
predominates, while the recreational activity sense is attested but
comparatively rare. If the court understands the search for plain meaning
to be a search for the most common sense of a word, then the court
might conclude that the plain meaning of sport is rule-based
competition. By contrast, the court understands contractual ambiguity to
include any contractual term that is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation, then the court might conclude that because
both senses of sport are attested, the word is ambiguous in the context of
the contract. Under such circumstances, courts may choose to fall back
on the contra proferentem canon, which holds that where the meaning of
a contractual provision is found to be ambiguous, courts should “adopt
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the meaning that is less favorable in its legal effect to the party who
chose the words.”171
4.

Corpus Linguistics and the Notion of a Core Meaning

Neither of these approaches to plain meaning or ambiguity seems
satisfactory. While courts sometimes frame the plain meaning
determination in terms of mere frequency of competing senses—
suggesting that the words of a contract should be given their “most
common meaning.”172 And while corpora can certainly provide evidence
of the comparative frequency of different senses of a contractual term,173
merely applying the most frequent sense regardless of context,
timeframe, and speech community would be largely arbitrary, but
possibly not wholly arbitrary.
Consider that many words have “at least one core sense or core
meaning, to which a number of subsenses may be attached,” and that
these “[c]ore meanings represent typical, central uses of the word in

171. KNIFFIN, supra note 1, § 24.27, at 282–83; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 206 (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party
who supplied the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.”).
172. RLS Assocs., LLC, v. United Bank of Kuwait PLC, 380 F.3d 704, 710–11 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“A court’s primary task in interpreting a contract is to determine intentions of the parties . . . as
objectively manifested by the language of the contract . . . . [G]iving the words used in a contract
their most common meaning generally serves this goal . . . .” (emphasis added)); Ragins v. Hosps.
Ins. Co., Inc., 4 N.E.3d 941 (N.Y. 2013) (“Similarly, the parties evidently intended that ‘damages’
would retain its most common meaning . . . .” (emphasis added)); Prudential Kahler Realtors v.
Schmitendorf, 673 N.W.2d 663, 666 (S.D. 2003) (“[W]here the parties to a contract cannot agree on
the interpretation of a word in the contract, this Court will apply the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ of
the disputed term. The most common meaning of the word shown is ‘to cause or allow to be seen;
display.’” (emphasis added)).
173. This is a common misreading of corpus-based approaches to legal interpretation—that
they merely find and apply the most common sense of a word. See Carissa B. Hessick, Corpus
Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1503, 1505–14 (2017); Ethan J. Herenstein,
The Faulty Frequency Hypothesis: Difficulties in Operationalizing Ordinary Meaning Through
Corpus Linguistics, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 112, 117 (2017). Such an approach would be
arbitrary and is not the approach advocated by proponents of corpus-based approaches to legal
interpretation. See In re Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 726 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring) (“I share
the view that we should not blindly attribute to every statutory term its most frequent meaning. Such
an approach would be arbitrary and would lead to statutory incoherence. This is not the approach I
have articulated, and not the one I have followed in my consideration of corpus linguistic data.”)
(citation omitted); Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies
and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1915, 1962 (2010) (“My
contention is not that because [sense 2] is far more common than [sense 1], [the statute] ought to be
interpreted with the [sense 2] meaning. Such a reading would be arbitrary. There are undoubtedly
circumstances in which Congress employees the less frequent of two senses of a word.”).
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question in modern standard English.”174 These core meanings can be
revealed by examination of corpus data.175 Computational linguists have
worked for decades to develop algorithms that will successfully choose
the correct sense of a polysemous word (a word with more than one
sense) for a given context. This process is called word-sense
disambiguation.176 Algorithms that favor the most common sense of a
word have a higher rate of accuracy and tend to choose the correct sense
in as many as two-thirds or three-fourths of cases.177 If we can generalize
these results to all questions of contractual ambiguity, then a heuristic
that is right about two-thirds to three-fourths of the time cannot be said
to be arbitrary. It is probabilistically non-arbitrary.
Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott have argued “[g]reater
accuracy is lower variance, and business parties commonly are
indifferent to variance. Thus, courts that interpret contracts as typical
parties prefer would be indifferent to variance as well, and sensitive only
to the costs of administering their evidentiary standard.”178 If it is true
that commercial parties elevate concerns about efficiency over concerns
about accuracy and variance, then a heuristic that applies the most
frequent sense (and does so in an automated fashion) may make sense.179
Such a heuristic would be more likely than not to be accurate and it
would certainly reduce costs of administering the evidentiary standard.
But it is not clear that commercial parties would desire an interpretive
heuristic that would provide one wrong answer for every two or three
right ones. Moreover, it is hard to imagine parties being able to draft
contracts against the backdrop of a rule that would ignore less common,
but perfectly well-attested senses of a word.

174. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH xi (3d ed. 2010).
175. Id.
176. See Timothy Chklovski & Rada Mihalcea, Exploiting Agreement and Disagreement of
Human Annotators for Word Sense Disambiguation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON
RECENT ADVANCES ON NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING 3, 4 (2003).
177. See id.
178. See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 577 (2003). Schwartz and Scott define “variance” as, “a measure of how far an
outcome can deviate from the mean of a distribution,”—if variance is large “the court makes in an
actual case may well be very far from the correct answer,” and “when the variance is small, the
court is likely to be close to the correct answer.” Id. at 555 n.65.
179. Indeed, algorithms that merely apply the most frequent sense of a word to a word-sense
disambiguation problem have been shown to be accurate in 55% of the instances tested. See KEITH
BROWN & KEITH ALLEN, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEMANTICS 224 (2009).
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Corpus Linguistics and “Sport” in Context

As set forth above, words may take on a particular, dominant sense
when used as a particular part of speech, or with a particular inflection,
or when surrounded by particular collocates, or when serving a
particular function or serving a particular function or performing a
particular role in a sentence. Linguistic corpora allow us to examine not
merely how often a word is used in a particular way but how often a
word is used in a particular syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic context, in
the speech or writing of a given speech community, at a given
timeframe. This is what is meant by the examination of context in this
Article. While courts agree that context is an important consideration in
legal interpretation, courts lack a shared, well-defined notion of what
context actually means and lack methods for gathering evidence of a
word’s use in a given context.180
The corpus can assist in the examination of the use of sport in more
detailed context. The examples above already begin with the correct part
of speech—looking at the use of sport the noun, rather than the less
common verb to sport meaning “to mock or ridicule” or “to display or
wear usually ostentatiously.”181 We can further limit the contextual
evidence by matching inflection (looking only to plural uses of sports).
Different inflections of a given word—including the singular and
plural forms of a noun—are often used in very different contexts.182 One
way to demonstrate this is by comparing the most frequent collocates of
the singular and plural forms.183 For example, the most frequent
collocates of the singular and plural eye and eyes.184 Color terms tend to
collocate only with the plural eyes while expressions that have to do
with visualizing and evaluation appear with only the singular, like keep
an eye out or turn a blind eye.185 A similar phenomenon can be observed
in the most common collocates of sport and sports.

180. See supra notes 76–80. As such, it is not sufficient to say that “everyone agrees that
context is important.” Carissa B. Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and Criminal Law, 2018 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1503, 1514 n.43 (2018). Even if it were true that everyone agreed that context is important,
judges and lawyers lack any meaningful way to gather evidence of usage in context, and, as noted,
lack a shared definition of what context actually means.
181. See Sport (Entry 1 of 3), MERRIAMWEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/sport [https://perma.cc/THT5-EQZH].
182. See Michael Stubbs, The Search for Units of Meaning: Sinclair on Empirical Semantics,
30 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 115, 120 (2009).
183. Id. at 119.
184. Id. at 120.
185. Id.
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Table 3:
Collocates of “Sport” and “Sports”
collocates of sport
utility, tires, medal, fish, vehicles,
trucks, mode, fisherman, pickup,
compact, polo, vehicle, blood,
hunting,
suspension,
species,
bikes, coats, wagon, sandals,
boots, demands, requires, jumping,
Mitsubishi

collocates of sports
medicine, fox, editor, news, cbs,
activities,
authority,
radio,
network, complex, usa, section,
bar, betting, music, memorabilia,
Denver, entertainment, stadium,
programs, car, arts, fantasy,
camps

There is no overlap between the collocates of sport and the collocates
of sports. This suggests that in order to determine the meaning of sports,
evidence of the use of the plural form ought to be examined.
In addition to examining uses of sports, the corpus permits the
examination of instances of sports with a similar syntactic relationship to
the other syntactic components of the contractual provision and similar
collocation (such as the words nearest to sports). For example, in the
passage in question, sports is the head of a noun phrase proceeded by
what is sometimes classified as a determiner, any.186 This may not seem
like a great deal of context to take into account. But consider that the
corpus contains 46,383 instances of the noun sport (13,750 singular,
32,633 plural), and only 84 instances of the noun phrase any sports.
An examination of these reveals that about two-thirds of these
examples explicitly referenced athletic competition—a proportion that
increases to about four-fifths when examples that strongly suggest
athletic competition are included (for example, references to sports
broadcasting, sports networks, etc.). A handful of the remaining
instances of any sports are uncertain. But there are no clear instances of
the physical recreation sense of sport. By taking into account a small
number of contextual factors (inflection, syntax, collocation), we may be
able to reduce the uncertainty about the meaning of sport in that context.
This does not mean that it is impossible for the phrase any sports to have
reference to physical recreation, only that such a reference is unattested

186. RODNEY HUDDLESTON & GEOFFREY K. PULLUM, CAMBRIDGE GRAMMAR OF ENGLISH
38085 (2002).
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in the corpus evidence and is, apparently, far less likely to occur than the
alternative sense.
One of the challenges for examining usage in context in a corpus is
that the greater the specificity of the search, the fewer examples appear
in the corpus. As noted above, the switch from sport to any sports
reduced the returns from approximately 45,000 to 84. Adding additional
contextual information to a search containing any sports may not be
possible in the COCA. For example, there are no examples of any sports
proceeded by the verbs practice or participate in the COCA. To locate
this usage, the corpus user would need a larger corpus. One such corpus
in the News On the Web (NOW) Corpus, which is a corpus of
approximately 7.4 billion words.187 And a search in the NOW Corpus
reveals only twenty-four instances of sentences in which the verb
participate or practice appears with any sport.188 Of these, only four
appear to be ambiguous, while three of the four contain contrastive
elements that suggest the athletic competition sense of sport (for
example “sports or physical exercise” and “sports or exercise”).189 Here
again, this does not mean that it is impossible that in the phrases
practicing for any sports or participating in any sports, the physical
recreation sense would occur. Rather, the corpus evidence simply shows
that the physical recreation sense of sport does not appear to be attested
in the semantic environment of practicing for or participating in. Not
only does this evidence suggest that the physical recreation sense of
sport is less likely to occur in this semantic environment, but it also
suggests that by adding additional contextual parameters, we may be
able to reduce our level of uncertainty about a contractual provision’s
meaning.
The examination of language evidence from linguistic corpora
certainly imposes costs beyond opening a dictionary, but it can provide
detailed information about the usage of the operative terms, without

187. See
NOW
CORPUS
(NEWS
ON
THE
WEB),
https://www.englishcorpora.org/now/?c=now&q=58217294 [https://perma.cc/QY4B-2XWB].
188. There are, essentially, two phrases of primary concern in this passage: practicing for any
sports and participating in any sports. These two phrases are collapsed into one by a syntactic
process referred to as conjunction reduction—in which “two syntactic heads of one phrase type are
followed by syntactically similar complements.” Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing
the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary when Interpreting legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 401, 431 (2003). See also Pieter Seuren, Semantic Syntax, in 74 LANGUAGE 664–65 (1998).
189. Supra note 187. To view instances of the phrase any sport near the verbs participate or
practice (1) Select “COLLOCATES” on the NOW Corpus homepage; (2) Enter “any sports” in the
“Word/phrase” field and “participate_v” or “practice_v” in the “COLLOCATES” field; (3) Click
“FIND COLLOCATES,” and (4) click “participate” or “practice.”
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incurring the costs associated with discovering information about trade
usage, contract negotiation, and course of dealing called for by the
contextualist approach. The use of corpus evidence also raises important
questions, including what types of contextual evidence ought to be
considered in evaluating claims of contractual meaning, and how many
instances of the usage of sports ought to be considered. And even the
largest corpus will have limited evidence of rare or highly contextualized
uses of a word.
Still, corpus evidence can give the judges and lawyers access to
information about the context in which the words or phrases of a
contract are used that cannot be accessed with a dictionary or through
introspection. The corpus allows interpreters to take account of the
specific inflection and context with which the operative term is used. It
allows interpreters to examine language use from the timeframe in which
the contract at issue was executed, and the possibly from the relevant
speech community. The availability of this usage information can allow
judges and lawyers to check their intuitions about the meaning of a legal
text and to verify and falsify claims about usage and meaning.
B.

Problem No. 2: The Plain Meaning of “Anticipated”

In UMB Bank, National Ass’n v. Airplanes Ltd.,190 A Lessor financed
the acquisition of a fleet of aircraft by issuing $3.7 billion in notes. The
notes were governed by an indenture and trust agreement, executed in
1996, that required the Lessor to maintain a reserve for required
expenses. The agreement defined the “Required Expense Amount” as
“(i) the amount of Expenses . . . due and payable on the Calculation Date
relating to such Payment Date or reasonably anticipated to become due
and payable before the end of the Interest Accrual Period beginning on
such date.”191
A foreign Lessee challenged Lessor’s ability to collect on its lease.
An international court found that Lessor’s attempts to collect were
unlawful and ordered Lessor to pay Lessee a large cash judgment and
punitive damages. Lessor appealed and an appellate court vacated the
award against Lessor. Lessee filed a motion for reconsideration.
Historically, such motions have an extremely low probability of being
granted in the relevant jurisdiction. Nevertheless, during the pendency of
the motion, the Lessor refused to make interest payments to the
Noteholders because a required expense was “reasonably anticipated to
190. 260 F. Supp. 3d 384, 396–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
191. Id. (emphasis added).
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become due and payable before the end of the Interest Accrual
Period.”192
Question: Does anticipated refer only to events that are likely to
occur, or does it include events that are merely possible, but
unlikely?
There seems little question that anticipated can refer to both expected
and unlikely events. Both uses of anticipated are well attested,193 and the
court was presented with dictionary definitions that appeared to support
both interpretations.194 The court tacitly acknowledged this dilemma by
refusing to arbitrarily select among two competing senses of anticipated
and instead turning to precedent.195
1.

Prior Case Law and the Plain Meaning of “Anticipated”

The UMB Court sought a “middle ground” by turning to what it
characterized as the “assembled case law.”196 But the three cases
examined by the court in Problem No. 2 perpetuate the same dictionarybased errors in reasoning. For example, the court cites SN Sands Corp. v.
City & County of San Francisco,197 in which the California Court of
Appeals held that “determination of . . . ‘anticipated expenditures’ must
be based on more than the mere possibility of incurring an
expenditure.”198 But the SN Sands Court relies on the same Merriam192. Id. at 394.
193. See, e.g., Richard Angus, How Your Outsourced CFO Can Help You Understand Business
Risk, LINKED IN (June 8, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-your-outsourced-cfo-can-helpyou-understand-business-angus [https://perma.cc/Z37H-QUG6] (“Professional managers and
business people anticipate unlikely events and take positive steps to manage company risk exposure
every day.” (emphasis added)); Ken Sandler, How Ballet Helps Pay for the Opera, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 1979, at D1 (“Mr. Bliss . . . hired Mrs. Hermann in 1975 as a special consultant: to
examine ways the Met could maximize its income; best utilize its theater, its house ballet troupe,
and its opera company; consider problems and options, and anticipate the unexpected.” (emphasis
added)); Scott Cacciola, Brett Brown & Steve Kerr: Coaches With Much in Common, Aside from
Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2016, at SP3 (“He had seen enough in his 15 seasons in the league to
anticipate the unexpected, to know that he needed to be prepared.” (emphasis added)).
194. See UMB Bank, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 395-96. The Noteholders cited Merriam-Webster.com,
which defines anticipate in part as “to look forward to as certain: EXPECT.” They also cited the
American Heritage Dictionary, defining anticipate as “[t]o see as a probable occurrence; expect.”
(emphasis added). The Lessor, by contrast, noted that the same Merriam-Webster.com definition
includes the sense “to give advance thought, discussion, or treatment to” and “to foresee and deal
with in advance: FORESTALL,” while a definition of anticipate in the McMillan Dictionary includes
the sense of “to guess that something will happen, and be ready to deal with it.”
195. UMB Bank, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 396.
196. Id.
197. 167 Cal. App. 4th 185 (2008).
198. Id. at 187.
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Webster’s definition cited by the Noteholders to reach this conclusion,
and fails to acknowledge any other definitions or explain why the
probable definition (one of six for anticipate) is the plain meaning.
The court in Problem No. 2 also cites Cyze v. Banta Corp.,199 in
which “the Northern District of Illinois interpreted an employment
contract that required an employer to provide severance benefits if an
employee was terminated . . . ’in anticipation of’ a change in control of
the company.”200 The Cyze Court reasoned:
First, Webster’s defines anticipation as “intuitive preconception
or a priori knowledge.”201 The next definition is “a prior action
that takes into account, deals with, or prevents the action of
another.” Finally, it offers “occurrence before the normal or
expected time; the act of looking forward.”202
The court fails to note that the Cyze Court is faced with a different
interpretive question. The provision at issue in Cyze features the noun
anticipation, while Problem No. 2 deals with the past participle form
anticipated. As discussed below, words like anticipation and anticipate,
which have similar derivational roots, can have markedly different uses
when they are used as separate parts of speech. If instead of looking in
the Webster’s Third for anticipation, the Cyze Court had been looking
for definitions of anticipate, it would have found the same competing
definitions cited by the Lessor and Noteholders.203
Finally, the court cites the decision in Al-Kasid v. L-3
Communications Corp.,204 in which the Eastern District of Michigan
reviews the same Merriam-Webster.com definitions reviewed above,
and concludes that the sixth of these (“to look forward to as certain”)
must apply.205

199. No. 07 C 2357, 2009 WL 2905595 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2009).
200. Id. at *3.
201. Id. at *3 (citing Anticipation, WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
UNABRIDGED 94 (1986) (noting that this is the second definition of “anticipation” in Webster’s).
202. Id. This is not the last definition of “anticipation” in Webster’s Third—it’s the fourth of six.
203. The Webster’s Third is the flagship, unabridged dictionary of the Merriam-Webster
Company and all Merriam-Webster dictionaries (including the website definitions cited by the
Lessor and Noteholders) are either heavily influenced by its definitions in the Webster’s Third or
reproduce its definitions outright. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 226 n.2
(1994) (“The Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionaries, published by G. & C. Merriam Company of
Springfield, Massachusetts, are essentially abridgments of that company’s Webster’s New
International Dictionaries, and recite that they are based upon those lengthier works.”).
204. No. 12-12948, 2013 WL 168885 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2013).
205. Id. at *7.
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Each of the cases cited merely repeats the errors that the court was
ostensibly attempting to avoid in the first place, and none of them have
the force of precedent in the jurisdiction in which the relevant case was
adjudicated (the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York). The UMB Court insists that a contract is ambiguous only if
“the provisions in controversy are reasonably or fairly susceptible of
different interpretations or may have two or more different meanings.”206
But like the court in Problem No. 1, the court here ignores a wellattested alternative sense.
2.

Plain Meaning, Inflection, and Part of Speech

There is another problem with both the court’s and the parties’
dictionary-based jurisprudence. Neither the parties, the court, nor the
“assembled case law” 207 cited by the court attempt to define the relevant
word form at issue in the contract. In each case, the parties and the cases
cited rely on dictionary definitions of the verb anticipate (with the
exception of the Cyze case, which defines the noun-form anticipation),
but none of them offers a definition of the past participial form
“anticipated.” There is at least one good reason for this omission: none
of the dictionaries cited by the parties (for example, Webster’s Third,
McMillan’s Dictionary) contains a separate definition for anticipated.208
It is not uncommon for dictionaries to make such omissions. Often
when a word is formed by a process of derivational affixation (the
adding of a prefix or suffix), only the base form is included in the
dictionary.209 But the omission of a separate definition for anticipated
does not necessarily mean that the word does not take on a specialized
meaning in certain contexts. Indeed, different word forms of the same
base or root word (often referred to as a lexeme) can take on
particularized meanings.210 We can observe this phenomenon by
conducting a simple comparison of the most common words to co-occur
206. UMB Bank, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 393 (quoting Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Almah LLC, 924
N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)).
207. Id. at 396.
208. The OED is not alone in this omission. The American Heritage Dictionary and Black’s
Law Dictionary do not separately define anticipated.
209. P.G.J. VAN STERKENBURG, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEXICOGRAPHY 121 (2003)
(“Restrictions on the inclusion and description of derivations that are regular/predictable in their
form-content systems are most clearly visible in paper-based dictionaries. In order to keep the
volume of a dictionary within reasonable limits, lexicographers have to use frequency criteria when
selecting items for [inclusion in the dictionary].”).
210. MICHAEL STUBBS, WORDS AND PHRASES: CORPUS STUDIES IN LEXICAL SEMANTICS 16–
17 (2001); SINCLAIR, TRUST THE TEXT, supra note 86, at 31.
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with anticipated and anticipated (i.e., their collocates). The table below
shows very little crossover between the most common words that cooccur anticipate and the past participle anticipated.211
Table 4:
Collocates of “Anticipate” and “Anticipated”
collocates of anticipate
problems, failed, changes, ability,
failure,
consequences,
fully,
reaction,
experts,
investors,
challenges, impossible, needing,
reasonably,
react,
analysts,
professionals, eagerly, arrival

collocates of anticipated
than, highly, eagerly, longer,
benefits, originally, faster, widely,
hotly,
demand,
outcomes,
consequences,
guilt,
actual,
reasonably, arrival, stronger,
films, anticipated, sooner

These collocates of anticipate and the past participle anticipated
suggest that these different parts of speech may appear in very different
contexts. This fact, at least, should make us skeptical of the practice of
looking to definitions of anticipate or anticipation to find the plain
meaning of anticipated.
3.

“Anticipated” in the Corpus

Turning to evidence from the corpus, we can use collocation data to
get a general sense of the use of anticipated. Because the Security Trust
Agreement at issue in Problem No. 2 was executed in 1996, we will look
at usage evidence from the COCA, which contains usage evidence
dating from that timeframe. And unlike the dictionary citations
referenced by the court, we will be able to limit our search to past
participial forms of anticipated.212 The fifty most common collocates of
anticipated are listed in the COCA as follows:
211. This data is based on data from the COCA, which will be discussed below. The COCA and
other BYU corpora are available without a subscription. See COCA Website, supra note 93. To
generate a list of collocates in the COCA you take the following steps: (1) Select “Collocates” on
the COCA homepage; (2) Enter “anticipate” in the “Word/phrase” field; (3) Enter an asterisk “*” (a
wildcard) in the “Collocates” field; (5) Select “Sort/Limit” and set the “Minimum” to “Mutual
Info”; and (6) Click “Find collocates.” Repeat the same process using “anticipated.”
212. On the COCA website: (1) Select “Collocates”; (2) Enter “anticipated” in the
“Word/phrase” field; (3) Enter an asterisk “*” (a wildcard) in the “Collocates” field;(4) Select
“Sections” and select “MAGAZINE” and “NEWSPAPER”; (5) Select “Sort/Limit” and set the
“Minimum” to “Mutual Info”; and (6) Click “Find collocates.” Id.
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than, highly, eagerly, longer, benefits, originally, faster, widely,
hotly, demand, outcomes, consequences, guilt, actual,
reasonably, arrival, stronger, films, anticipated, sooner,
revenues, earnings, losses, slower, correctly, shortfall, sequel,
planners, impacts, retirements, debut, departure, announcement,
tougher, surge, warming, designers, feared, matchup, quicker,
organizers, scenarios, crowds, dreaded, shortages, reunion,
volumes, emergence, accommodate, endanger.
These collocates of anticipated seem to suggest contexts in which
anticipated events are regarded as more probable than not, though not
necessarily certain, such as revenues, losses, expenses, restaurant
openings, novel releases, etc. However, it is not necessarily clear that
such revenues, losses, expenses, restaurant openings, or novel releases
are more probable than not.
Turning to the KWIC evidence from the COCA, nearly all of the
contexts in which anticipated appears in the corpus evidence refer to
circumstances in which a particular outcome is expected and believed to
be probable.213

213. To view the concordance lines for anticipated (1) Select “KWIC” on the COCA
homepage; (2) Enter “anticipated” in the “Word/phrase” field; (3) Select “Sections” and select
“MAGAZINE” and “NEWSPAPER”; (4) Click “Keyword in Context (KWIC).” Id.

16 - Mouritsen (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

10/21/2019 7:41 PM

CORPUS-BASED CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

1385

Table 5:
“Anticipated” in the COCA
this is Singer’s
much
with a look at the
most
Markets have
developed . . . Much
more slowly than
earlier
commission has
received 4,105 of
these plans, which
present
cannabis takers. The
control initiative of
MDT has not
produced
radio interviews that
Wasserstein would
be doing as part of
her
want to have read it
before you pick up
the most

anticipated
anticipated

follow-up to his
breakthrough [the Usual]
Suspects
performances in movies of
the season

anticipated.

anticipated

worst-case scenario and
explain how evacuations
would be

anticipated

benefits. A supportive drug
substitution and

anticipated

big book tour. Too much
loss, says a character in

anticipated

book of the fall season

My analysis of the evidence of from the COCA suggests that in its
most common use, anticipated is used to describe events that are
expected, believed to be probable, and looked forward to, such as the
anticipated release of an album, or the anticipated sequel to a film. In
nearly every other context found in the concordance evidence in the
corpus, the word anticipated can easily be substituted for expected
without a change in meaning, whereas unlikely, but possible cannot be
substituted without changing the meaning. Though expected is the most
common sense of anticipated, the unlikely, but possible sense is certainly
attested, and anticipated is sometimes used to describe preparations for
possible, but unlikely events. Thus, while it is clear that anticipated can
be used to mean both expected or unlikely, but possible, a review of 100
instances of anticipated reveals only a single instance where the
unlikely, but possible sense is attested.
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If courts continue to define ambiguity as “susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation,”214 then we can make a case for the
contractual language in Problem No. 2 to be ambiguous. As with sport in
Problem No. 1, there are, after all, two attested uses of anticipated and it
is not clear what would make either reading more reasonable except that
one sense appears to be much more commonly used that the other. With
such a stark contrast in the use between the expected and unlikely, but
possible senses of anticipated, there is a reasonable case for the notion
the overwhelming prevalence suggests a likely the plain or plain
meaning.
While it is true that anticipated may be used to describe both expected
and unlikely events, the usage evidence from the corpus demonstrates
that where an unlikely event is intended, the surrounding context appears
to make this sense explicitly clear by including words like “unlikely,”
“unexpected,” or “worst case.” This suggests that the base or unmarked
case for anticipated is the expected sense, while the unlikely, but possible
sense must be specially indicated. Because there is no such indication
contractual provision at issue, we can feel more confident that the base
or unmarked sense of anticipated was intended.
C.

Problem No. 3: The Plain Meaning of “Governable”

In 1961, a Lessor separately negotiated mineral leases with two
parties—Lessee A and Lessee B—for minerals mined in Forum X.215
Both Lessees separately agreed to pay Lessor no less than the highest
royalty rate that each paid to any other lessor in Forum X. The original
royalty rate was 5%. Lessor sought to ensure that Lessee A and Lessee B
would pay the same royalty rates during the 100-year pendency of their
respective leases. Lessee B, concerned that Lessor and Lessee A would
unilaterally negotiate a higher royalty rate, agreed to pay the same
interest rate as Lessee A, subject to the following exception:
Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this agreement to the
contrary, the royalties to be paid to Lessor by Lessee B for
minerals mined from the licensed premises during any quarter
shall in no event be at rates less than royalty rates pursuant to
which royalties are paid to Lessor by Lessee A during the same
quarter, if and to the extent that the royalty rates paid to Lessor
by Lessee A pursuant to their agreement are governable by the

214. Hegel v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., 778 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 2015).
215. These facts are adapted, altered, and greatly simplified from the case of Ciner Wyoming,
LLC v. Rock Springs Royalty Co., No. C-16-77-L (D. Ct. Wy 2016).
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royalty rates paid by Lessee A pursuant to the provisions of any
lease or license from the United States of America for the
mining, removing, and disposing of minerals upon lands in
Forum X.
In 2006, the National Heritage Areas Act reduced the federal royalty
rate on the relevant mineral from 6% to 2%. Lessor continued to charge
both Lessee A and Lessee B a 5% royalty rate. Subsequently, Lessor and
Lessee A negotiated an increase in the royalty rate to 8%. Lessor began
to charge Lessee B at the increased 8% royalty rate. Citing the exception
clause above, Lessee B sued claiming that the agreement between Lessor
and Lessee A was no longer “governable by” the federal rate (now 2%)
and so Lessee B was no longer required to match the rate paid by
Lessee A. Lessor argued that the plain meaning of “governable” is
“capable of being governed.” While Lessee A was now paying a higher
rate than the federal rate, its agreement with Lessor was still “capable of
being governed” by the federal rate at the parties’ discretion or in the
event the federal rate increased to 8%.
Question: Does governable always mean “capable of being
governed” or can it also have a mandatory sense of “must be
governed”?
It is hard to imagine that the Lessee would have intentionally entered
into a lease agreement that leaves the royalty rate up to the discretion of
the lessor and a third party. However, courts routinely state that the best
evidence of the parties’ contractual intentions is the “plain language” of
the contractual text.216 It is therefore possible that a court would read
“governable” as “capable of being governed” and as granting discretion
to the Lessor and Lessee A to set the royalty rate paid by Lessee B.
1.

When Definitions Are Not Found in the Dictionary

Lessee B needs to demonstrate that governable can have a mandatory
sense. The trouble is that no such definition of governable can be found
in the dictionaries most commonly cited by courts.217 The Webster’s
Third and the Oxford English Dictionary (two of the dictionaries most

216. Glen Banks, 28 N.Y. PRAC., CONTRACT LAW § 9:3 (2018) (“The best evidence of what
parties to a written agreement intended is what they said in their writing. The primary objective of
contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ intent as manifested in the words they chose to
use.”).
217. Indeed, the author was unable to locate any dictionary that defines governable with a
mandatory sense.
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often cited by American courts)218 records only the “capable of being
governed” definition of governable.219 And, as discussed above, courts
routinely turn to general-use dictionaries to search for the plain meaning
of contractual terms.220 Indeed, courts have gone so far as to conclude
that a sense of a word that is not recorded in a dictionary cannot be the
word’s plain meaning.221
But dictionaries are not complete repositories of every possible way
in which a given word has ever been used. They often omit infrequent
words or infrequent senses. “This gap between dictionaries and the
lexicon results from a balance that every dictionary must strike: It must
be comprehensive enough to be a useful reference but concise enough to
be printed, shipped, and used. As such, many infrequent words [and
word senses] are omitted.”222 Lexicographers draft dictionaries using
impressionistic observations of incomplete usage evidence, so it is not
uncommon for dictionaries to omit rare words or rare senses.223 In
addition, dictionaries often omit separate definitions for words that are
formed through a process derivational affixation—as when a new word
is formed by adding a new word ending (to govern + -able).224

218. Samuel A. Thumma & and Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress:
The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 262–63 (1999).
219. See
Oxford
Univ.
Press,
Governable,
OXFORD
ENG.
DICTIONARY,
www.oed.com/view/Entry/80305?redirectedFrom=governable [https://perma.cc/99C8-BGKD].
220. See, e.g., Never Tell Farm, LLC v. Airdrie Stud, Inc., 123 F. App’x 194, 198 (6th Cir.
2005) (noting that “courts often refer to dictionary definitions in order to determine the ordinary
meaning of undefined contract terms.”); Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Portal Healthcare Sols.,
LLC, 35 F. Supp. 3d 765, 770 (E.D. Va. 2014) (noting that “courts customarily turn to dictionaries
for help in deciphering a [contractual] term’s plain meaning.”); Laport v. MB Fin. Bank, N.A., 983
N.E.2d 1055, 1059–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“[A]n undefined term in a contract will be given its
plain and ordinary meaning, which is found in its standard dictionary definition.”).
221. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 569 (2012) (“Any definition of a word
that is absent from many dictionaries . . . is hardly a common or ordinary meaning.”).
222. Michel et al., supra note 56, at 176; see also BIBER ET AL., supra note 55, at 36–41
(demonstrating that general-use dictionaries omit relevant senses).
223. BIBER ET AL., supra note 55, at 26 (“[C]itation slips [from which lexicographers draft
dictionary entries] represent only those contexts that a human reader happens to notice . . . .”);
LANDAU, supra note 55, at 104 (“Even very large citation files, because they are collected by a
process of selection, cannot be used reliably for statistical studies of frequency because they are apt
to be unrepresentative of the language as a whole.”).
224. Johan de Caluwe & Johan Taeldeman, Morphology in Dictionaries, in A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO LEXICOGRAPHY 114, 121 (Piet van Sterkenburg ed., 2003) (“Restrictions on the inclusion
and description of derivations that are regular/predictable in their form-content systems are most
clearly visible in paper-based dictionaries. In order to keep the volume of a dictionary within
reasonable limits, lexicographers have to use frequency criteria when selecting items for [inclusion
in the dictionary].”).
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The Lessor’s argument may also have some intuitive appeal not only
because the “capable of being governed” sense is the only sense of
governable recorded in any dictionary, but also because the suffix -able
is very commonly added to transitive verbs to give them the meaning of
capable of—teachable means “capable of being taught”; washable means
“capable of being washed.”
2.

The Mandatory Sense of -able

Even though no dictionary presents a mandatory sense of governable,
there are numerous words formed with the suffix -able that take on a
mandatory sense when used in a legal context. For example, rent that is
“payable” on the first of the month is not “capable of being paid”; it
must be paid on the first of the month.225 Income that is “reportable” on
a tax filing is not “capable of being reported”; it must be reported.226
Taxpayers are not merely capable of paying taxes on their “taxable”
income; they must pay their taxes.227 This use of words formed with able is highlighted in the Cambridge Grammar of English, which makes
clear that such words often have a mandatory sense:
The modal meaning [of -able] is generally like that of can.
Sometimes, however, it is stronger, like that of must or will. Compare,
for example, It is payable at any post office (“can be paid”) with It is
payable by 15 June (“must be paid”) or The question isn’t answerable
(“can’t be answered”) with The minister is answerable to Parliament
(“has to answer”). Note also The deposit is refundable (“will be
refunded”).228
While the mandatory sense of governable is not reflected in any
dictionary, the mandatory sense of -able is. The Oxford Dictionary of
English229 defines -able as follows:
225. See Payable, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed.
2012) (defining payable as “[r]equiring payment on a certain date; due,” or “[r]equiring payment to
a particular person or entity” (emphasis added)).
226. Reportable, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1925 (1971) (defining
reportable as “2: required by law to be reported . . . .” (emphasis added)).
227. See Taxable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1688 (10th ed. 2014) (defining taxable as “1.
Subject to taxation”); Taxable, 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 678 (2d. ed. 1989) (defining
taxable as “1. Liable to be assessed (to a tax, impost, or charge); assessable . . . . 2. Liable to be
taxed; subject to a tax or duty.”) (emphasis added).
228. RODNEY HUDDLESTON & GEOFFREY K. PULLUM, CAMBRIDGE GRAMMAR OF ENGLISH
1707 (2002).
229. Though published by the Oxford University Press, the Oxford Dictionary of English is
unrelated to the OED. The former is a contemporary dictionary compiled with the aid of
sophisticated electronic linguistic language database.
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-able → suffix forming adjectives meaning: 1 able to be: calculable.
2 due to be: payable. 3 subject to: taxable. 4 relevant to or in accordance
with: fashionable. 5 having the quality to: suitable | comfortable.230
What this means is that a mandatory sense of governable is, at least,
possible in a legal context, just like the mandatory senses of payable,
taxable, and reportable are all possible senses in a legal context. The
next question is whether this use of governable was attested in speech or
writing at the time of the drafting of the agreement and whether it makes
sense in the context of the agreement.231
3.

“Governable” in the Corpus

Turning to the corpus evidence, we are faced with a series of
challenges. The first is frequency. Governable is an uncommon word,
and the contested mandatory sense of governable is an even less
common sense of an uncommon word. In the COCA, governable has
eight collocates that co-occur with governable three or more times:
more, country, space, time, subjects, democracy, area, less
None of these collocates appear to have any reference to a mandatory
sense of governable. This result is supported by an examination of the
concordance lines of governable in the COCA.232

230. Able, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 4 (2010). The Oxford Dictionary of English also
notes that contrary to popular perception, the morpheme -able and the adjective able, are
etymologically unrelated, even though they have similar meanings. Id. (“[O]RIGIN from French –
able or Latin -abilis; originally found in words only from these forms but later used to form
adjectives directly from English verbs ending in -ate, e.g. educable from educate; subsequently used
to form adjectives from verbs of all types (influenced by the unrelated word ABLE), e.g. bearable,
saleable.”).
231. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 17a (1971) (“The system of
separating by numbers and letters reflects something of the semantic relationship between various
senses of a word. It is only a lexical convenience. It does not evaluate senses or establish an
enduring hierarchy of importance among them. The best sense is the one that most aptly fits the
context of an actual genuine utterance.”).
232. COCA Website, supra note 93. The concordance line search in COCA is executed as
follows: (1) Select “KWIC” on the COCA homepage; (2) Enter “GOVERNABLE_j” in the
“Word/phrase” field; (3) Select “Sections” and select “MAGAZINE” and “NEWSPAPER”; (4)
Click “Keyword in Context (KWIC).” Id.
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Table 6:
“Governable” in the COCA
move toward
making Washington
Bosnia today is a
mess, barely
we have a country
that is
look, unless Gaza
becomes a relatively
peaceful area, a
Act expanded the
common market and
rendered many areas
of policy
It’s critical for the
United States to have a
is happening on
the ground
FRANKEN Would it
be a more
are the next step,
so it is not exactly a
prisoner’s
dilemma can be
broken, and a more
hamper the
willingness to
compromise that is
needed in a

governable

again. And I suspect he’s
going to actually be a

governable

and economically dead.

governable
governable

and which people
participate with joy and
with freedom and
area, an area from which
attacks do not emanate,
then

governable

by a qualified majority,
rather than allowing every
member a

governable

country on our—on our
southern border. And
NAFTA,

governable

country, in your opinion,
if Saddam Hussein was
replaced ?

governable
governable

governable

country. So, I think we are
putting too much on
democracy can take root.
However, since the
prisoner’s
democracy and that is
especially critical during
the

In the 560 million words that make up the COCA, governable occurs
only forty-two times. Of these, most instances of governable fairly
unambiguously refer to the notion of “capable to be governed.”233
In addition, the contract at issue in Problem No. 3 was executed in
1961. This may militate in favor of looking to linguistic evidence from a
233. Id.
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time period closer to the date of drafting. To accomplish this, we can
attempt to look for concordance evidence in the Corpus of Historical
American English (COHA). The COHA is “the largest structured corpus
of historical English.”234 It contains “more than 400 million words of
text from the 1810s-2000s (which makes it 50–100 times as large as
other comparable historical corpora of English) and the corpus is
balanced by genre decade by decade.”235 This allows the user to gather
language evidence from the decade in which a text is drafted, going back
approximately 200 years.
The challenge is that for each decade, the COHA has a comparatively
small amount of data—only twenty million words. When dealing with
low frequency senses of low frequency words, the COHA may not have
sufficient data to reliably attest the ways in which a word was used.
Indeed, in looking at evidence from the COHA for 1950 through 1970,
governable appears in the corpus only three times—twice in the same
paragraph from the same text:
Table 7:
“Governable” in the COHA—1950s through 1970s
The slogan now
is: Is New York
when he says,
Of course it is
His admiration
of his
captain, Robert
Gray, was

governable
governable.
governable

? And I agree with John
Lindsay when he says ,
Because we haven’t any
choice but to make it
? none of Gray’s mates of
record thought he was a

Here again, each of these instances of governable supports the
“capable of being governed” sense.
As discussed above, some words formed with –able can have a
mandatory sense—e.g., payable, reportable, and taxable. This suggests
that a similar mandatory sense of governable is, at least, possible. If this
is the case, we might expect to see this use of governable attested in a
text. The apparent absence of the mandatory sense of governable in the

234. Id.
235. Id.
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COCA and COHA could be taken as a strike against Lessee B’s
argument in Problem No. 3.
The search could be further specified by including the phrase
“governable by” followed by a noun or noun phrase, similar to the way
in which the word is used in the contract. However, neither the relevant
portions of the COCA nor the evidence from the COHA for the 1960s
records a single instance of this usage of governable.236 The larger NOW
Corpus records some twenty-four instances of “governable by” followed
by a noun or noun phrase. 237 In each case, the capable of being
governed sense occurs.
The COCA and COHA are both corpora that largely reflect different
genres of Standard Written American English, while the mandatory
senses of words formed with -able tend to appear in legal contexts (a
lease making rent payable on the first of the month, a tax code making
certain income reportable). If we are looking for a specialized legal
sense of governable, then a corpus of Standard Written American
English may not be the right dataset. By contrast, if we turn to a legal
database like Westlaw, we can find numerous instances of the
mandatory, legal sense of governable, including a number of instances of
this sense from the timeframe in which the contract at issue in Problem
No. 3 was executed:

236. To confirm the lack of instances of the phrase “governable by” followed by a noun or noun
phrase in the COCA, (1) Select “KWIC” on the COCA homepage; (2) Enter “governable by” in the
“Word/phrase” field; (3) Select “Sections” and select “MAGAZINE” and “NEWSPAPER”;
(4) Click “Keyword in Context (KWIC)”; To confirm the lack of instances of “governable by”
followed by a noun or noun phrase in the COHA, (1) Select “KWIC” on the COHA homepage;
(2) Enter “governable by” in the “Word/phrase” field; (3) Select “Sections” and select 1950, 1960,
1970; (4) Click “Keyword in Context (KWIC).”
237. To view instances of the phrase “governable by” followed by a noun or noun phrase,
(1) Select “KWIC” on the NOW Corpus homepage; (2) Enter “governable by” in the
“Word/phrase” field; (3) Click “Keyword in Context (KWIC).”
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Table 8:
“Governable” in Legal Context238
[family] status that
has long been
recognized to be

governable

by the law of the
domicile for purposes of
marriage,
divorce,
[etc.]239

In this diversity suit

governable

by the law of the State of
New York 240

the
conduct . . . herein is
solely

governable

by the law of
Commonwealth
Pennsylvania241

The situation here
encountered is

governable

by the rule established in
the case of Hatch v.
Bassett242

their subject matter
is constitutionally

governable

by rules promulgated by
this court243

the contract . . . is
thus

governable

by the statute of frauds,
not the statutes of wills244

the transaction
between the parties was

governable

by the law applicable to a
promissory note245

the
contract . . . having . . .
been made in
Louisiana, and
therefore

governable

by the laws of that
state246

the
of

238. These examples were located by searching for the phrase “governable by” in the “All State
& Federal” search field on Westlaw.
239 Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917, 921 (R.I. 1968).
240 Lee v. St. Joe Paper Co., 371 F.2d 797, 797 (2d Cir. 1967).
241 Bonwit Teller v. Dist. 65, 142 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1958).
242 In re Beuckmann’s Will, 118 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1953).
243 Columbia Lumber v. De Stefano, 95 A.2d 914, 917–18 (N.J. 1953).
244 Eberle v. Ohlheiser, No. HHDCV126029172, 2012 WL 5201312, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 27, 2012).
245 Corrigan v. O’Reilly, 107 A.2d 322, 323 (R.I. 1954).
246 Alexandria. v. Johnson, 59 P. 1063, 1065 (Kan. 1900).

16 - Mouritsen (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

CORPUS-BASED CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

10/21/2019 7:41 PM

1395

In the examples above, family status isn’t merely “capable of being
governed” by the law of domicile; it must be governed by the law of
domicile. A contract is not merely capable of being governed by the
statute of frauds; it must be governed by the statute of frauds.247 The
instances of governable in Table No. 8 demonstrate that even though the
mandatory sense of governable is a less common (virtually unattested)
sense of the word in Standard Written American English, the mandatory
sense is well attested in legal contexts (just like the mandatory senses of
other words formed with –able—payable, taxable, and reportable).
Because it is virtually unattested in Standard Written American English,
the mandatory sense of governable may not be the first sense that comes
to mind when a judge examines the text of a contract. Indeed, the
existence of the mandatory sense may not even occur to the judge. Nor
could the judge find the mandatory sense by looking to a dictionary.
This is one of the principal utilities of corpus linguistics: to reveal
information about language that is not available through introspection or
dictionaries.
Similar evidence for a more mandatory sense of governable can be
found by searching through a database of contracts that are included
with public company filings with the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). One such database is LawInsider.com.
LawInsider.com is a database that collects “over 3,264,137 contracts
[that are contained in] SEC document filings that have been catalogued
and indexed by contract type, state/jurisdiction, company, signees and
filing date.”248 A search for governable in these documents reveals only
a handful of uses, some of which appear to suggest a mandatory, legal
sense. For example, one financing agreement contains an express
“Affirmative Covenant” which states: “7.8 Compliance with Laws:
Continue at all times to comply with all laws, ordinances, regulations,
requirements and Governable Regulations of any Governmental
Authority relating to Borrower’s business, property or affairs.”249
Though capitalized, “Governable Regulations” is not a defined term.
However, the context makes clear that compliance with these regulations
is not a matter of discretion. Similarly, a loan agreement contains a
provision for payment of taxes, which states: “(b) Payment of Other
247. See Eberle, 2012 WL 5201312, at *6.
248. See LAW INSIDER, https://www.lawinsider.com [https://perma.cc/3Z32-W5HJ].
249. See Loan Financing Agreement, LAW INSIDER (Dec. 29, 2015) (emphasis added),
https://www.lawinsider.com/contracts/58GFAXs9BGNMdULL8p4Csn/universal-truckloadservices-inc/financing-agreement/2015-12-29 [https://perma.cc/F8ZA-A39X].

16 - Mouritsen (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

10/21/2019 7:41 PM

1396

[Vol. 94:1337

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Taxes by the Borrowers. Each applicable Borrower shall timely pay any
to the relevant Governable Authority in accordance with applicable law,
or at the option of the Administrative Agent, timely reimburse it for,
Other Taxes.”250 Here again, “Governable Authority” is capitalized, but
is not a defined term in the contract. But there is no suggestion that the
payment of taxes or the identity of the taxing authority are matters of
discretion under the agreement. These examples suggest that there exists
a specialized, legal use of governable that has a mandatory, rather than a
discretionary, sense.
Both Westlaw and LawInsider have a number of limitations as
linguistic corpora. Neither allows a user to easily gather information
about usage over time, or information about collocation, nor does either
allow for the concordance of usage evidence. But in the absence of a
principled linguistic corpus of American legal discourse, Westlaw and
LawInsider can nevertheless be useful for gathering evidence about the
legal usage of a word, especially when that evidence can be compared
against usage evidence from a corpus of Standard Written American
English like the COCA or COHA.
Problem No. 3 illustrates the importance of matching the right corpus
to the right question. The evidence suggested that governable may have
a specialized, mandatory sense that appears only in legal contexts. If that
is the case, then we would expect that a specialized legal usage would be
attested in a corpus of legal texts. To be sure, Westlaw and LawInsider
leave much to be desired as a corpus. Neither allows its user to see
frequency information about the use of a given word, including
frequency distribution through time. The texts in each have not been
annotated with linguistic metadata, like part-of-speech tagging, which
limits its utility as a linguistic corpus. Neither database offers much of
the typical functionality of a linguistic corpus, like the ability to search
for collocates or review concordance lines. Nor are they designed to be
representative of the speech or writing of a given speech community
(lawyers) or to present a representative sample of legal language use
(including samples of legal language usage in lawyer speech, or text or
email correspondence). Still, both Westlaw and LawInsider.com share a
few features with a linguistic corpus. They are very large collections of
easily searchable texts and can be useful tools to locate and examine the
250. See Myers Industries, Inc., MYE Canada Operations Inc., Scepter Canada Inc. and the Other
Foreign Subsidiary Borrowers Party Hereto, Fifth Amended and Restated Loan Agreement Dated as of
March 8, 2017 The Lenders Party Hereto and JPMorgan Chase Bank, LAW INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2017)
(emphasis added), https://www.lawinsider.com/contracts/6eZudbm2DQzBvmSCOszuBS/myers-industriesinc/amended-and-restated-loan-agreement/2017-03-09 [https://perma.cc/Y4NM-Y28W].

16 - Mouritsen (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

10/21/2019 7:41 PM

CORPUS-BASED CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

1397

specialized legal use of a given word or phrase. That is the task that they
perform here.
In this case, the contract makes the most economic sense if
governable takes on a mandatory meaning. But this sense of governable
does not appear in any dictionary and does not appear to occur in
common usage. Using an electronic collection of legal texts, we are able
to demonstrate that an uncommon sense of a word in fact exists and is
well-attested in legal texts. Once we have demonstrated that the
contested sense of governable exists, we are better positioned to argue
that this previously unknown sense best fits the context of the contract
and ought to control in the court’s interpretation of the contract.
D.

Problem No. 4: The Plain Meaning of “Structural Damage”

A homeowner’s insurance policy provides coverage for structural
damage to a home resulting from a sinkhole.251 The home in question
experienced “widespread, minor cracking to both the exterior and
interior of the home” as the result of a sinkhole, but did not suffer any
damage that would “impede[] the structural components from supporting
the loads that they are intended to support.”252 The policy does not
define structural damage, and there is no relevant statutory definition.
Prior decisions interpreting similar language and applying relevant state
law have reached opposite conclusions about the meaning of structural
damage.253
Question: Does structural damage mean any “physical damage
to a building,” or only “‘damage that impairs the structural
integrity [or load bearing capacity] of the building’”?254
The court faced with Problem No. 4 appealed to the “plain meaning”
of structural damage,255 reasoning that “[i]f the relevant policy language
251. This problem is based on Hegel v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., 778 F.3d 1214, 1216–22 (11th
Cir. 2015).
252. Id. at 1218, 1222 (citing FLA. STAT. § 627.706(2)(c) (2005)).
253. Id. at 1220 (“Even the district judges in the Middle District of Florida, in interpreting the
same term in similar insurance policies under Florida law, have reached opposite conclusions.
Compare Ayres v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 8:11-cv-816-T-24TGW, 2012 WL 1094321, at *4
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2012) (unpublished) (holding that structural damage means ‘damage to the
structure’), with Gonzalez v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1231
(M.D.Fla.2013), and Franqui v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 8:12-cv-01257-T-27MAP, 2014 WL
1092405, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2014).”).
254. Hegel, 778 F.3d at 1219, 1221.
255. Id. at 1220 (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th
Cir. 2004) (“Florida courts start with the plain language of the policy as bargained for by the parties.
If that language is unambiguous, it governs. If the relevant policy language is susceptible to more
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is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing
coverage and the other limiting coverage, the insurance policy is
considered ambiguous, and must be interpreted liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the drafter who prepared the policy.”256
Acknowledging that “differing interpretations of the same provision
[are] evidence of ambiguity,” the court found that “no genuine
ambiguity” existed in the interpretation of the phrase structural
damage.257 The court insisted that the words structural and damage
“cannot be viewed in isolation” and that the court must “‘construe an
insurance contract in its entirety, striving to give every provision
meaning and effect.’”258
The court further appealed to a familiar canon of contract
interpretation known as the canon against surplusage, which holds that
courts “must read the contract to give meaning to each and every word it
contains,” and “avoid treating a word as redundant or mere surplusage
‘if any meaning, reasonable and consistent with other parts, can be given
to it.’”259 With this in mind, the court reasoned that because “structural
damage” was necessary for the homeowner to recover, equating
“physical damage” with “structural damage” would read “structural
damages” out of the policy. 260 Indeed, the court noted that that “at oral
argument, [the homeowner’s] counsel . . . was unable to identify what
type of damage to the property would not be ‘structural’ under their
preferred definition.”261
1.

“Structural Damage” in the Dictionary

Even though the court insisted that structural and damage cannot be
viewed in isolation, the court looked to dictionary definitions of
structural and structure only in order to determine the plain meaning of

than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and the other limiting coverage, the
insurance policy is considered ambiguous, and must be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured
and strictly against the drafter who prepared the policy.”)).
256. Id. (quoting State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th
Cir.2004)).
257. Id. The court noted that “at oral argument, counsel . . . was unable to identify what type of
damage to the property would not be structural under their preferred definition.” Id. at 1221.
258. Id.
259. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape
Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009)).
260. Id.
261. Id.
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structural damages.262 The court noted: “‘Structural’ is an adjective,
defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘[f]orming a necessary part
of the structure of a building or other construction, as distinct from its
decoration or fittings.’ The noun ‘structure,’ on the other hand, is simply
a synonym for a building.’”263 The court cites only the Oxford English
Dictionary when seeking to find the plain meaning of structural
damage,264 and cites precedent suggesting that citation to a dictionary is
a best practice when interpreting contracts.265 Consistent with prior
instances of the dictionary/intuition approach, the court does not explain
why the court references only a single definition from the Oxford
English Dictionary, rather than numerous competing senses of structural
listed in other common, unabridged dictionaries, which make clear that
both senses of structural relevant here are attested. For example,
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines structural as both
“1 a : of or relating to structure or a structure [and] . . . b : of or relating
to the load-bearing members or scheme of a building as opposed to the
screening or ornamental elements.”266 Nor does the court account for the
fact that both senses of structural damage are well attested in common
usage.267

262. Id. Interestingly, the court fails to note that the Oxford English Dictionary does, in fact,
separately define structural damage, as “damage to the structure or overall stability of something;
esp. damage to a building, bridge, etc., sufficient to impair its structural integrity.” Oxford Univ.
Press, Structural, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/191887
[https://perma.cc/UJM3-6N9Y]. Notice, however, that this definition is disjunctive and contains
both the notion “damage to the structure,” as well as damage “sufficient to impair its structural
integrity.” As noted below, both of these senses are well attested in common usage.
263. Hegel, 778 F.3d at 1221.
264. Id.
265. See Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 969 So.2d 288, 291–92 (Fla. 2007) (stating that insurance
contracts are construed according to their plain meaning and that, when doing so, courts may
consult dictionary definitions).
266. Structural, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2266 (1975).
267. See Jerry Thomas, Historic Bar Jolted in 2-Car Crash: Green Door Stays Open Despite
Extensive Damage, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 1998, § 2, at 5 (“The building, which was built in 1872, one
year after the Great Chicago Fire, suffered structural damage to the exterior, but business continued
as usual . . . .”); Kristen Reed, et al., Car Hits Office; Drug Charges Filed, ORLANDO SENTINEL:
CENTRAL FLORIDA, Dec. 23, 2006, at B3 (“The car plowed into a building across the street from the
old downtown Sanford Courthouse mid-morning, causing minor structural damage to its exterior.”);
Cracks a Concern at Middle School, ELMIRA STAR-GAZETTE, Aug. 27, 2008, at 1 (“The district,
facing ‘serious structural damage’ at the façade at Ernie Davis [Middle School], is putting up
netting in case bricks fall.”). These examples were located using an online dictionary database,
NEWSPAPERS.COM (last visited April 14, 2018).
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“Structural Damage” and the “Pet Fish” Problem

Even if the court had looked to definitions of both structural and
damage, the underlying assumption that the meaning of structural
damage is merely the sum of its parts is not defensible. Sometimes the
meaning of words and phrases cannot correctly be understood as the sum
of their constituent parts. Instead, the meaning of an expression must be
understood as crossing the boundary of what we traditionally think of as
a word (a string of letters separated by a space, or collection of sounds
separated by a pause).268 While the minimum standalone unit of meaning
of an utterance will often be what we traditionally think of as a word.269
This is the problem that has been characterized by Professor Larry Solan
as the “pet fish” phenomenon:
The “pet fish” phenomenon occurs when two words combine to
produce a meaning that is not the mechanical composition of the
two words separately . . . . Thus, the prototypical “pet” is a dog
or a cat; the prototypical “fish” is a salmon or cod—but the
prototypical “pet fish” is neither a dog nor a salmon, but is
clearly the goldfish.270
Linguist John Sinclair referred to a similar feature of language when
he discussed the “idiom principle,” the notion that “a language user has
available to him or her a large number of semi-preconstructed phrases
that constitute single choices [in the creation of an utterance], even
though they might appear analysable into segments.”271 A speaker
cannot break down many linguistic utterances into their constituent
parts. These include idiomatic expressions (like, pull someone’s leg,
paint the town red, kick the bucket), phrasal verbs (like, get down, make
out, carry on about), and collocates or words that commonly occur in the
same environment (as in the semantic prosody example above). Such
multi-word strings are sometimes referred to as “lexical items,” a
minimal standalone unit of meaning that includes the traditional notion
of a word, but also includes many multi-word utterances.272 We may not
268. See Alison Wray, Why are We So Sure We Know What a Word Is?, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE WORD (John R. Taylor ed., 2015).
269. See id.
270. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES
AND THE CONSTITUTION 62 (2016).
271. Sinclair, J.M., Collocation: a progress report, in LANGUAGE TOPICS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF M. HALLIDAY 319, 320 (Ross Steele & Terry Threadgold eds., 1987).
272. Among these lexical items are words that co-occur so often that they take on a specialized
meaning when they appear together in certain contexts. This is phenomenon is referred to as
“collocation,” which means “a frequent co-occurrence of words [that] does not have a profound
effect on the individual meanings of the words, but there is usually at least a slight effect on the
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be able to account for the meaning of phrases like structural damage
without accounting for the meaning of the phrase as a whole.273
3.

Co-selection, Delexicalization, and the Canon against Surplusage

The court in Problem No. 4 insisted that equating any damage or
“physical damage” with “structural damage” would read “structural” out
of the policy. In so doing, the court invoked the so-called canon against
surplusage (or superfluity), which requires that courts “read the contract
to give meaning to each and every word it contains,” and “avoid treating
a word as redundant or mere surplusage ‘if any meaning, reasonable and
consistent with other parts, can be given to it.’”274 Under the surplusage
canon “[w]ords are never to be construed as meaningless if they can be
made effective by any reasonable construction of the contract,” and the
court should “strive to give meaning to every sentence, clause and
word.”275 The surplusage canon is classified as a linguistic canon of
interpretation,276 which means, ostensibly, that its legitimacy may “stand
or fall by [its] accuracy in reflecting relevant linguistic practices.”277
But, as discussed below, evidence of language use from linguistic
corpora gives us reason to be skeptical that the canon against surplusage
is a generalizable and descriptive statement about the way language
actually works.
There is strong evidence that rather than choosing each word carefully
and independently to convey an intended meaning, the choice of a given
word often conditions the choice of the next word.278 This process is
called co-selection, and there is strong evidence that co-selection is a
fundamental part of word choice in natural language.279
A necessary corollary of co-selection is delexicalization—a loss of
independent meaning that occurs when a word is subconsciously

meaning, if only to select or confirm the meaning appropriate to the collocation, which may not be
the most common meaning.” SINCLAIR, TRUST THE TEXT, supra note 86, at 28.
273. ALAN CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE 74 (2010).
274. Hegel v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., 778 F.3d 1214, 1221 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Equity
Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir.
2009)) (emphasis added).
275. GLEN BANKS, 28 N.Y. PRAC., CONTRACT LAW § 10:7 (2018).
276. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079,
1126 (2017).
277. Id. at 1084.
278. SINCLAIR, TRUST THE TEXT, supra note 86, at 19.
279. Id.
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selected as a collocate of another word.280 As Professor John Sinclair
observes:
The meaning of words chosen together is different from their
independent meanings. They are at least partly delexicalized.
This is the necessary correlate of co-selection. If you know that
selections are not independent, and that one selection depends
on another, then there must be a result and effect on the meaning
which in each individual choice is a delexicalization of one kind
or another. It will not have its independent meaning in the full if
it is only part of a choice involving one or more
words . . . . [There] is a strong tendency to delexicalization in
the normal phraseology of modern English.281
Consider the following pairings of adjectives and nouns, which were
found in an examination of corpus evidence. Normally we “understand
in grammar that adjectives add something to the noun, or restrict the
noun, or add some features to it.”282 While this is “no doubt true in some
cases,”283 there are many instances where the adjective appears to be the
result of co-selection and is delexicalized, in part or in whole:
Table 9:
Delexicalization of Adjectives
The officers stood in close [physical] proximity to the victims.
The chemists conducted a [scientific] experiment.
The restaurant was at [full] capacity, so they wouldn’t seat us.
Each of the sentences in Table No. 9 above can be read with or
without the bracketed term without changing the meaning of the
sentence. Moreover, with or without the bracketed term, each of the
sentences above is a perfectly well-formed, grammatical English
sentence. Still, native English speakers will commonly include such
delexicalized adjectives in their communication and will do so
subconsciously.284 This does not mean that adjectives like “physical,”
280. Id. at 20.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. At this point, it is possible that some readers will protest that careful writing of the kind
they have been trained to perform requires the careful (and highly circumscribed) use of adjectives.
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“scientific,” and “full” are meaningless. It means that in certain contexts,
through the process of co-selection, such adjectives are delexicalized and
add little or no communicative context to an utterance.
With this understanding, we can reexamine the Problem No. 4 court’s
reliance on the surplusage canon and the claim that reading “structural
damage” as merely “physical damage” would read “structural” out of the
contract.285 Consider the following uses of “structural” based on words
that are found to commonly co-occur with “structural” in the COCA.
Table 10:
Delexicalization of “Structural”
The earthquake impaired the [structural] integrity of the building.
The contractor lacks sufficient [structural] steel to finish the building.
The building collapsed due to the failure of [structural] supports.
Here again, each sentence in Table No. 10 above can be read with or
without “structural” without changing the meaning of the sentence. But
with or without “structural,” each sentence is nevertheless a perfectly
well-formed and grammatical English sentence. The reader wouldn’t
notice anything unusual with or without “structural.” Native English
speakers commonly include delexicalized adjectives like “structural” in
sentences because co-selection is part of the human language faculty,
and “structural” tends to systematically co-select with words like
“integrity,” “engineer,” “steel,” etc. This does not mean that the word
“structural” is meaningless. It is easy to think of examples in which a
“structural” engineer may be contrasted with other types of engineers, or
“structural” steel may be contrasted with other types of steel. The
question is whether there are contexts in which structural does not add
independent semantic content to a sentence, other than to highlight or
Self-assessment of one’s own adjective use specifically (and one’s own linguistic behavior
generally) is a highly suspect enterprise. In an essay for Slate.com, Mark Liberman, the head of the
Linguistic Data Consortium (“LDC”) at the University of Pennsylvania, demonstrated with corpus
evidence that many highly regarded authors have a high adjective count, and indeed, many selfproclaimed adjective critics also have an unusually high adjective count in their own prose. See
Mark Liberman, Stop Hating on Adjectives and Adverbs, SLATE: LEXICON VALLEY (Sept. 10, 2013,
3:43 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2013/09/adjectives-and-adverbs-mark-twain-suggestedkilling-them-but-counting-modifiers-says-nothing-about-the-quality-or-clarity-of-writing.html
[https://perma.cc/CF46-S5M3].
285. Hegel v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., 778 F.3d 1214, 1221 (11th Cir. 2015).
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underline the noun it modifies. That is, there may be contexts in which
“structural” will be paired with some of the word’s common collocates
in ordinary speech because of subconscious co-selection, even though
“structural” does not add independent meaning to an utterance.
With this in mind, consider the Court in Hegel v. Liberty Insurance
Corp.’s286 complaint that “at oral argument, counsel . . . was unable to
identify what type of damage to the property would not be ‘structural’
under their preferred definition.”287 In the examples above, what type of
steel could possibly be implicated, but “structural” steel? What type of
building integrity could be impaired by an earthquake if not its
“structural” integrity? The court is insisting that “structural” must have
some independent meaning, but there is plenty of evidence to suggest
that “structural” may simply appear in the contract as a result of
subconscious co-selection and, consequently, “structural” is
delexicalized and contributes nothing to the meaning of the provision.
4.

“Structural Damage” in the Corpus

We can confirm our reading of structural damage by examining the
collocation data for structural damage in the COCA.288 The fifty most
common collocates of structural damage are listed as follows:
damage, no, any, major, caused, cause, homes, causing,
building, severe, suffered, revealed, serious, significant,
reported, sustained, reports, buildings, injuries, brain, trees,
due, mri, showed, extensive, 90, heavy, sustain, knee, flooding,
suffer, widespread, further, progression, tornado, earthquake,
bone, roof, assessment, engineers, improving, suffering, causes,
appear, avoid, termites, inhibiting, bruise, hoboken, minimal
These data suggest two broad uses for structural damage, one related
to damage to the human body (MRI, injuries, brain, knee, bone, bruise),
and the other related to manmade structures (homes, building). The harm
to the human body uses of structural damage are not relevant to the
question in the case. When we examine structural damage in context,
these will be excluded. And at least some of the collocates suggest
events of the sort of severity that could harm the load bearing capacity of
a building (tornado, earthquake, termites), but for the most part, these
286. 778 F.3d 1214, 1221 (11th Cir. 2015).
287. Id.
288. On the COCA website: (1) Select “Collocates”; (2) Enter “structural damage” in the
“Word/phrase” field; (3) Enter an asterisk “*” (a wildcard) in the “Collocates” field; (4) Select
“Sections” and select “MAGAZINE” and “NEWSPAPER”; (5) Select “Sort/Limit” and set the
“Minimum” to “Mutual Info”; and (6) Click “Find collocates.” COCA Website, supra note 93.
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collocates do not indicate whether a “load bearing” or “of or related to
structure” sense of structural is implicated. A tornado or earthquake may
harm the load bearing integrity of a building or simply cause superficial
damage. At the very least, we would need more information to draw
conclusions about the meaning of structural damage in the context of
Problem No. 4.
We can examine more closely the distribution of senses of structural
damage using the concordance feature of the COCA. Using the COCA,
we can generate a randomized collection of sample concordance lines
showing the variety of contexts in which structural damage occurs. As
noted above, the corpus allows us to look at the use of structural damage
together rather than looking at both terms in isolation. We can target the
time period in which the contract was executed and we can use the
corpus evidence to determine the frequency of the different senses of
structural damage.289
In evaluating the concordance lines, we are looking for the uses of
structural damage most similar to those in the contract at issue in
Problem No. 4. The concordance evidence reveals four general
categories of things that experience structural damage: buildings,
bodies, roads, and automobiles. These different contexts are sometimes
reflected in the sense division (or macrostructure) of dictionaries. We
will exclude from the analysis uses of the phrase that appear in separate
contexts and focus only on those contexts that are related to the
contractual language, for example, the building contexts.

289. The concordance line search in COCA is executed as follows: (1) Select “KWIC” on the
COCA homepage; (2) Enter “structural damage” in the “Word/phrase” field; (3) Select “Sections”
and select “MAGAZINE” and “NEWSPAPER”; (4) Click “Keyword in Context (KWIC).” Id.

16 - Mouritsen (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

10/21/2019 7:41 PM

1406

[Vol. 94:1337

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Table 11:
“Structural Damages” in the COCA—1990 to the Present
life-threatening and
historic storm surge, as
well as
it’s built to sustain
no
Power loss and
they elicited
complaints about
his $48,000
deductible—the amount
of
to wave-battered
Atlantic City, the storm
caused extensive
the campuses of the
University of Houston
but no apparent

structural
damage
structural
damage
structural
damage
structural
damage
structural
damage

that
could
make
buildings and homes
uninhabitable
during the most powerful
kind of earthquake likely
from the storm are likely
to affect other businesses,
from
their
upstairs
neighbors . The real
difficulty
his home must suffer
before the insurance
company

structural
damage

in cities and towns along
the coast of New Jersey.

structural
damage

to the buildings ,
Chancellor Renu Khator
told CNBC on

The concordance evidence shows that both of the competing uses of
structural damage are attested. There are uses of structural damage that
reflect the harmful to load-bearing integrity sense. And there are uses of
structural damage that reflect the mere physical damage to a structure
sense.
In a review of 100 randomized concordance lines from the COCA,
fifty-eight appeared in a building related context. There were twelve
instances in which the context clearly indicated the harm to structural
integrity use of structural damage and only two instances in which any
harm to a structure was indicated. There were forty-four instances in
which there was no way to tell whether either sense was intended.
This raises an important question in terms of the theorization of
contractual plain meaning. In the few cases in which the context makes
clear that one or the other of the senses should apply the harm to loadbearing integrity sense is the most common. And, to the extent that we
agree that there is a frequency component to plain meaning, we might
take this as evidence that this structural integrity meaning is the plain
meaning. However, in most of the instances in which structural damage
to buildings appears, there is no way to distinguish between the two
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relevant senses. This is true even in the natural disaster context, where
wind, flood, or fire may be said to cause structural damage, but without
more, we cannot tell whether that damage harmed the structural integrity
of a building or merely caused superficial damage.
This suggests that the phrase structural damage is underspecified
with respect to the extent of the damage implied. Under-specification is
the “omission of information from linguistic descriptions to capture
several alternative realisations of a linguistic phenomenon in one single
representation.”290 Under-specification is a common cause of linguistic
ambiguity.291 In such cases, in which we are able to distinguish among
senses, it is only because the sentence provides us with additional
information. This would mean that the phrase structural damage is
necessarily (linguistically) ambiguous with respect to the extent of
damage. This would also mean that the court’s conclusion that there was
“no genuine ambiguity” in the agreement was incorrect.292 This evidence
also suggests that within the phrase structural damage, the adjective
structural is the product of co-selection and delexicalization.
This is an important contribution of corpus linguistics when applied to
questions of legal interpretation. Corpus linguistics does not simply
mechanically identify plain meaning. Instead, corpus-based language
evidence can give content to the idea of legal ambiguity. How to address
ambiguity in a legal text is a legal question that may be outside of the
domain of linguistics. But the identification of meaning and ambiguity
can be greatly facilitated with language evidence.
It is important to distinguish the identification ambiguity in Problem
No. 4 from similar findings of ambiguity in the experiments on bias in
judging ambiguity referenced above.293 The referenced study described
the identification of ambiguity based on intuitive judgments about texts,
and not based on objective evidence of usage.294 In such circumstances,
“[i]f one person says that both proposed readings of a [text] seem
plausible, and a colleague disagrees, finding one reading too strained,
what is there to do about it but for each to stamp his foot?”295 By
contrast, a corpus-based identification of contractual ambiguity is based
290. Markus Egg, Semantic Underspecification, in 1 SEMANTICS 535, 536 (Claudia Maienborn
et al. eds., 2001).
291. See id.
292. Hegel, 778 F.3d at 1220.
293. Ward Farnsworth et al., Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal
Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 271 (2010).
294. See id. at 257–60.
295. Id. at 276.
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on an evaluation of language evidence—an evaluation that can be
replicated and falsified.
V.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF THE
CORPUS APPROACH

The problems above illustrate some of the potential contributions that
linguistic corpora can make to addressing problems of contract
interpretation meaning. Evidence from corpora can be used to test
intuitions about the meaning of contractual terms. The corpus can assist
in creating a complete picture of the way in which a word is used in a
given context by a given speech community and at a given time. The
corpus can take account of the syntactic, semantic, and even pragmatic
context of an utterance. Unlike the dictionary, the corpus allows its users
to examine utterances at the word, phrase (or idiom), or sentence level,
and the corpus can take account of multi-word lexical items. Corpus
searches can be tailored to the timeframe in which a given text was
drafted. And corpus evidence can take account of differences in genre,
dialect, register, and speech community. Moreover, the evidence relied
upon by a corpus user can be made available to subsequent users to
verify (or falsify) prior results. None of these tasks can be performed by
a jurist’s unaided intuition or by a dictionary.
Relying on corpus evidence to evaluate the way in which words are
used in a contract can remove questions of plain meaning from the black
box of a judge’s intuition and compel judges and lawyers to address
problems of plain meaning and ambiguity in more concrete, evidencebased terms. Moreover, corpus evidence may be used to reexamine (and
possibly reformulate) existing canons of contractual interpretation.
Even with all of these potential contributions of corpus linguistics to
contract interpretation, there are still a number of questions with which
the law must grapple before the corpus approach can be fully integrated
into contract interpretation. These include the relevant reference
timeframe for the interpretation of a contract, the relevant register or
speech community for the interpretation of a contract, and the
appropriate method for validating corpus results. Each of these are
addressed below.
A.

The Reference Timeframe for Contract Interpretation

The trouble is that in many cases it is not at all clear when a given
provision of a contract was initially drafted or whether the linguistic
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norms at the time of the contract’s drafting have any bearing on the
interpretation of specific provisions.296 While it is true that the
“[t]raditional model of contract interpretation focuses on the ‘meeting of
the minds,’” it is likewise true that “[n]ot all contracts and contract terms
are individually negotiated.”297 Specifically, “boilerplate terms are not
the product of any actual meeting of the minds,” and are “not
representations of the specific intent of the parties to the transaction.”298
There are a variety of ways to approach this problem using linguistic
corpora. The first is to assume that, regardless of the timeframe in which
a given provision first appeared, the language of a contract must be
presumed to reflect the intention of the parties at the time it was
executed. This is, of course, a legal fiction, but it is not an unprecedented
one.299 Imposing such a legal fiction on the parties to a contract may
counsel extra vigilance in contract drafting and negotiation and may lead
to more dynamic contract drafting. Existing corpora can be brought to
bear to help identify the relevant linguistic conventions. Moreover, as
noted above, specialized, industry-specific general corpora or industryspecific contract corpora may, in many cases, be preferable for
determining the linguistic conventions of a particular industry.
A second approach would be to identify whether or not a provision at
issue in a given case had been separately negotiated, and if so, to
interpret the provision consistently with the linguistic norms prevailing
at the time of execution. If the provision had not been separately
negotiated, the interpreter would then determine when the provision in
question first appeared in contracts in the relevant industry and allow the
linguistic norms prevailing at the time when the provision was first
drafted to inform the interpretation. Such an approach would require the
creation of a collection of historical contracts corpora that would track
the development and evolution of contracts. While this may sound like a
significant undertaking, at least some relevant collections of historical
contracts are already in existence. These could be uploaded into a corpus
interface without significant challenges. The question, then, is not

296. See generally Weidemaier et al., Origin Myths, Contracts and the Hunt for Pari Passu, L.
& SOC. INQUIRY (2013).
297. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1129
(2006).
298. Id. at 1160.
299. See Tal Kastner, The Persisting Ideal of Agreement in an Age of Boilerplate, 35 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 793, 803 (2010) (“[T]he doctrinal presumption of enforceability of form language reflects
an acknowledgement of the limits of knowledge and choice in assent, as well as the de facto
operation of boilerplate in establishing the substance of a contractual arrangement.”).
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whether it is necessarily possible to interpret the non-negotiated,
boilerplate terms of a contract according to the linguistic conventions
prevailing at the time when they were drafted, but whether it is
appropriate to do so. If—as courts routinely insist—the objective of
contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ intent, it is difficult
to meaningfully ascribe intent to parties that did not draft or negotiate
the language in question and who may never have bothered to read it.
Both approaches assume that the interpretation of boilerplate
provisions has anything to do with identifying the linguistic conventions
of a given speech community. Professor Michelle Boardman has
observed that “[b]oilerplate [language] that has repeatedly been
construed by courts will take on a set, common meaning, but one that
may not be easily understood by reading the language itself.”300 Thus,
“the meaning ascribed to the language by an innocent first reader will
different markedly from the meaning the language is given in court, the
meaning upon which drafters rely.”301 This circumstance may create an
“illusion of understanding,” one that may only be remedied by
“knowledge of the subsequent case law and regulatory actions.”302
In such a circumstance, courts commonly find themselves construing
boilerplate (determining its legal effect) rather than interpreting it
(determining its conventional, semantic meaning).303 In such
circumstances, language evidence from the corpus may have less to
offer. On the other hand, where prior courts have not yet construed the
boilerplate language at issue in a given case, the corpus may provide
useful information about the conventional, semantic meaning of the
words in the provision.
The corpus is agnostic as to the question of reference timeframe
posed above. If the question is whether a provision of a contract was
specifically negotiated, or when particular language was first included in
similar contracts, or what were the prevailing linguistic conventions at
the time of execution or at the time when specific language was first
drafted—corpus linguistics can provide helpful, linguistic evidence to
address such questions. But the question of whether to apply a legal
fiction and interpret contracts according to linguistic conventions
prevailing at the time they are executed—regardless of whether or not

300. Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2006).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1109–10.
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the individual provisions have been separately negotiated and agreed to
by the parties—is a jurisprudential question that cannot be addressed
with corpus evidence.
B.

Register and Speech Community in Contract Interpretation

A further issue arises with the question of speech community. As
discussed above, courts often turn to general-use, unabridged English
dictionaries when called upon to interpret contracts. This seems to
suggest that courts view the task of interpretation as identifying
linguistic conventions that are consistent with Standard Written
American English. It is not necessarily obvious that all contracts are
written with Standard Written American English in mind. As we saw
with governable in Problem No. 3, some words take on a specialized
sense in certain legal contexts. We would expect contracts to adopt the
linguistic conventions of the industry or subject matter for which they
are drafted.
The interpretation of a contract should take into account the linguistic
speech community for which it was drafted. In the case of consumer
contracts, we might adopt a legal fiction that presumes the contract
should be interpreted according to linguistic conventions of a particular
industry. The construction of a specialized, industry-specific corpus may
be necessary to properly account for the linguistic conventions of that
industry.
Sometimes it will not be clear whether a given, contested word or
phrase takes on a specialized meaning in a particular legal or
commercial context. In such circumstances the use of comparative
corpora of both Standard Written American English and the relevant
legal or commercial speech may be necessary to identify specialized
uses of a term, as demonstrated by the identification of the specialized
legal use of governable identified in Problem No. 3.
C.

Validating (or Falsifying) Corpus-Based Results

One advantage of a corpus-based approach to contract interpretation
is the ability of third parties to either validate or falsify corpus-based
results. When using a corpus to address an interpretive question leaves a
trail of the methods used and the evidence considered. The corpus user
may also download the evidence in question and provide it to third
parties. A party attempting to verify or falsify the result may repeat the
same queries or review the same evidence.
Corpus evidence is not the only linguistic evidence used to evaluate
questions of contractual meaning. In their recent article, Interpreting
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Contracts via Surveys and Experiments, Omri Ben-Shahar and Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz propose to incorporate empirical survey methods from
trademark and unfair competition cases into contract interpretation.304
Ben-Shahar and Strahilevitz argue that survey methods can provide realworld evidence of public perception of contractual plain meaning, as
well as real-world evidence of what changes in contractual language
would result in less ambiguity.305 They further argue that surveys can
“capture that meaning more accurately than a judge’s imagination.”306
Surveys may also be able to provide information about the way a
contract would be interpreted by different speech communities.
The corpus approach and the survey approach each have their
comparative advantages. Sophisticated linguistic corpora are freely
available from any computer terminal and can be put to use with
adequate training. Because linguistic corpora rely on naturally occurring
language (rather than language elicited from survey respondents), corpus
linguistics is able to avoid some of the difficult-to-mitigate design
challenges and context effects that surveys may be subject to.307 “Even
the best designed elicitation tasks are removed from how people use
(and think about) language in everyday life, and people’s reports of their
linguistic usage may or may not match up with what they actually do.”308
However, linguistic corpora face their own design challenges,309 and
because corpus evidence is typically limited to natural language, it is
sometimes the case that sufficient texts may not be available to make
judgments about the linguistic conventions of the relevant speech
community or register at the relevant time.310 By contrast, survey
304. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts via Surveys
and Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753 (2017).
305. Id. at 1780.
306. Id. at 1759.
307. See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS, 142 (Paul J. Lavrakas ed., 2008);
EDWARD K. CHENG ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 7:20 (2017) (“The order in which questions are asked on a survey and the order in
which response alternatives are provided in a closed-ended question can influence the
answers . . . . Although these effects are typically small, no general formula is available that can
adjust values to correct for order effects . . . .”); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioral Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 676–77 (1999)
(discussing context effects).
308. Natalie Schilling, Surveys and Interviews, in RESEARCH METHODS IN LINGUISTICS 102
(Robert J. Podesva & Devyani Sharma eds., 2014).
309. See Douglas Biber, Representativeness in Corpus Design, in 8 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC
COMPUTING 243 (1993).
310. This problem was highlighted by the complete absence of examples of the phrase any
sport in the context of the verbs participate and practice in the COCA and the paucity of examples
of the same in the NOW Corpus. See supra note 191.
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methods allow for the particular interpretive question to be narrowly
drafted and specifically targeted to the relevant speech community. This
may allow survey methods to better account for some contextual
information—like the social or spatial context of an utterance—that may
not be easily addressed with corpus evidence.
At bottom, corpus linguistics and survey methods measure different,
but possibly related linguistic phenomena. Corpus linguistics can
identify the linguistic conventions of a speech community based on that
community’s language output or production in natural language settings.
Survey methods, by contrast, may measure language perceptions that
cannot as easily be captured with usage evidence from a corpus.
D.

The Meaning of Ambiguity and the Law of Interpretation

One contribution of the corpus approach highlighted above is the
ability to provide objective evidence of the range of potential senses of a
given word in a contractual context. For example, in the cases of sport in
Problem No. 1 and anticipated in Problem No. 2, the courts purported to
identify the plain meaning of the operative term, and concluded that
there was no ambiguity, even though the corpus evidence made clear
that both of the contested senses of sport and anticipated were possible,
attested senses.311 If the standard for what constitutes ambiguity is
“capable or susceptible of different interpretations,” then both courts’
conclusions about plain meaning are in error. The proposition that
disputed contractual terms that are the subject of a litigated dispute could
be susceptible of only one plain meaning is rarely justifiable. After all,
“[p]eople spend the money to come to court only when it is possible to
draw conflicting inferences from the words alone.”312 Moreover, as
noted above, the more common a word is, the more likely it is to have
multiple senses. And the more senses a word has, the more likely
interpreters are to disagree about its meaning in a given context.313
The judicial propensity to gloss over problems of ambiguity and to
arbitrarily select among competing meanings is not new. Arthur L.
Corbin observed:
All through the history of the common law, there is found a very
common assumption of the existence of antecedent rules and
principles, beginning no man knows when, coming from no man
311. See supra section IV.A (Problem 1) & section IV.B (Problem 2).
312. Frank Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (1988).
313. See supra note 37.
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knows where, seemingly universal and unchangeable . . . . And
yet, at almost all periods, there have been a few jurists who took
thought to the matter and who knew better . . . . Among such
rules are those indicating that words must have one, and only
one, true and correct meaning, [which] must be sought only by
poring over the words within the four corners of the
paper . . . .314
Of course, judges know that contractual language can be ambiguous
and have developed rules of interpretation to guide judicial decisionmaking in the event that such ambiguity is identified. The Plain Meaning
Rule is one such rule. Another is the contra proferentem canon, which,
as noted above, holds that where the meaning of a contractual provision
is found to be ambiguous, courts should “adopt the meaning that is less
favorable in its legal effect to the party who chose the words.”315 We can
well imagine a court applying the contra proferentem canon to both
Problem Nos. 1 and 4 because in both cases there were at least two
competing uses of the operative terms (sport and structural damage) and
because the canon tends to be applied “more rigorously” in insurance
contracts, where it is recognized that there is a “difference between the
parties in their acquaintance with the subject matter.”316 This is the role
that such canons have historically played in the resolution of contractual
ambiguity.
In their recent article, The Law of Interpretation, Professors Will
Baude and Stephen E. Sachs argue that “an instrument’s legal effect

314. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 535, at 499 (1952); see also id. at 496–97
(“It is true that when a judge reads the words of a contract he may jump to the instant and confident
opinion that they have but one reasonable meaning and that he knows what it is. A greater
familiarity with dictionaries and the usages of words, a better understanding of the uncertainties of
language, and a comparative study of more cases in the field of interpretation, will make one beware
of holding such an opinion so recklessly arrived at.”).
315. See KNIFFIN, supra note 1, § 24.27, at 282–83. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 17, § 206 (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party
who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.”).
316. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601–02 (2d Cir. 1947); see also
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 682 F.2d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 1982) (“[A]ny remaining
doubts about interpretation of the policies are properly resolved in favor of the insured, in order to
effectuate the policies’ purpose of providing coverage.”). The contra proferentem canon is not
limited to cases of linguistic ambiguity but may also be applied in circumstances where the scope of
the insurance contract is merely uncertain. Ins. Co. N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d
1212, 1219–20 (6th Cir. 1980) (“If there are ambiguities in the policy, or uncertainty over its
interpretation, the policy is to be construed against the insurer, and in favor of the insured.”
(emphasis added)).

16 - Mouritsen (2).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

CORPUS-BASED CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

10/21/2019 7:41 PM

1415

doesn’t just follow from the meaning of its language . . . .”317 Instead,
“the legal system frequently chooses artificial rules of interpretation, and
once chosen they’re the law, whether or not they reflect what a given
text really meant.”318
This may be correct. But even if the law of interpretation stands
poised to provide a substantive (or “artificial”) resolution to problems of
ambiguity, it can do little to assist the court with the antecedent
identification of ambiguity that is embedded in many contract
interpretation canons, including the Plain Meaning Rule and the contra
proferentem canon.
Many of the so-called “substantive” canons of interpretation are in
fact hybrid canons of interpretation—they require, first, the
identification of the presence of ambiguity, and second, a determination
of the legal effect of that ambiguity. In the context of criminal law,
courts apply the rule of lenity, which requires, first, the identification of
an ambiguity in a criminal statute, and second, the resolution of that
ambiguity in favor of the criminal defendant. Though the number of
steps in the application of Chevron deference is a matter of some
dispute,319 a familiar account requires that a court first determine
whether a statute is silent or ambiguous on a subject, and second, defer
to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if the interpretation of the
agency is reasonable.320
Viewed in this light, the law of interpretation often becomes a
collection of heuristics that resolves only second-order interpretive
problems. It is a law of Step-two, but not of Step-one.
If we accept the common definition of contractual ambiguity as
language that is “capable or susceptible of different interpretations,”321
then we would have to conclude that the courts in Problem Nos. 1, 2,
and 4 got it wrong. In each case, the court purported to identify the plain
meaning of the operative term (sport, anticipated, and structural
damage), and in each case, the operative term had more than one attested
use, a fact that each court ignored or, at least, failed to meaningfully
317. Baude & Sachs, supra note 276, at 1083.
318. Id. at 1095.
319. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 757 (2017); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Verneule, Chevron Has Only One Step,
95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
320. Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
321. Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts
Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 184 n.30 (1995) (collecting
cases).
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evaluate and explain. We can also imagine that a court applying the
same definition of ambiguity to Problem No. 3, and concluding, as a
result of courts’ traditional reliance on dictionaries, that governable has
only one meaning (because governable has only one definition in several
common dictionaries). This result seems unsatisfactory because it fails to
take account of a well-attested, specialized legal meaning that appears to
do a better of job of reflecting the parties’ reasonable economic
expectations.
The incongruity between the evidence from the corpus on the one
hand and the common judicial understanding of ambiguity on the other
suggests two possible outcomes. Courts must either refine their
understanding of plain meaning and ambiguity, or they should abandon
the Plain Meaning Rule altogether. If we define ambiguity as the
existence of two possible interpretations, then virtually every contractual
provision contains some ambiguity and the application of the Plain
Meaning Rule is always problematic. On the other hand, if we do away
with the Plain Meaning Rule entirely, we eliminate the benefits of
objectivity and efficiency that the rule purportedly provides.
One possible solution would require reformulating the rule in terms of
probability. To the extent that we are confident that we have identified
the appropriate syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic context of the
interpretive question at issue, and to the extent that we are confident that
we have correctly identified the relevant speech community, register,
and timeframe for the interpretive task at hand, we might entertain a
rebuttable presumption in favor of an overwhelmingly more common
use of the word or phrase in the context in question. The strength of this
presumption would be correlated to the prevalence of a particular use of
a word or phrase, in a particular (semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic)
context, in the language use of a particular speech community, and
language used at a particular timeframe. The more prevalent the usage in
this context, the stronger the contrary evidence would need to be to rebut
it. In Problem Nos. 1 and 2 above, the overwhelmingly more common
uses of sport (“rule-based competition”) and anticipated (“expected,
likely event”) would control unless strong evidence were brought
forward to rebut the application of these senses. In Problem No. 4, where
the linguistic evidence makes clear that neither sense of structural
damage is overwhelmingly more common (or even discernible from
context), the court would be free to allow additional extrinsic evidence
under the Plain Meaning Rule, or to apply a substantive canon, like the
contra proferentem canon.
Problem No. 4 illustrates that the Plain Meaning Rule may not be the
only canon of interpretation in need of reexamination (and, possibly,
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reformulation). In that case, the court applied the so-called canon against
surplusage and insisted that reading “structural damage” as mere
“physical damage” to a structure would render “structural” meaningless
in violation of the canon against surplusage. But the corpus evidence
failed to show any meaningful way to distinguish among the competing,
contested uses of “structural damage,” and, indeed, the corpus evidence
gives a strong indication that the adjective “structural” adds little to
nothing to the meaning of the contractual provision at issue in Problem
No. 4 and that the court’s insistence to the contrary is mistaken.
Commenting on the surplusage canon in the statutory context, William
Baude and Stephen E. Sachs observed that “[i]f redundancy were
actually far more common than we realized among the relevant readers
and speakers, then the canon against superfluity might need to be
modified or abandoned.”322 The presence of co-selection and
delexicalization in Problem No. 4 (and the prevalence of co-selection
and delexicalization as a common linguistic phenomena as demonstrated
in language evidence from linguistic corpora) suggest that redundancy in
human language is much more common than some jurists believe and
that a reformulation of the surplusage canon may be in order. Moreover,
Baude and Sachs are undoubtedly correct that “[i]t’s no answer to say, as
some defenders of the surplusage canon do, that ‘[contracts] should be
carefully drafted,’” or that contract drafters “‘ought to hire eagle-eyed
editors’ to conform . . . to the canon.”323 Even when engaged in the type
of more or less careful use of language that contract drafting entails,
there is no evidence that contract drafters are exempt from the
subconscious co-selection and delexicalization of words that is one of
the hallmarks of word choice by competent English speakers. Nor is
there any evidence that “eagle-eyed editors” are capable of identifying
and striking redundant words that are subconsciously selected in this
way. Instead, the prevalence of subconscious co-selection and
delexicalization established by the corpus evidence suggests that the
surplusage canon may be in need reformulation to account for common
linguistic redundancies.
What is clear from the Problems examined above is that the concepts
of Plain Meaning and ambiguity are incompletely theorized. In order for
322. Baude & Sachs, supra note 276, at 1126.
323. Id. at 1126–27 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 179 (2012)). As noted, the quotation here is in reference to the
use of the surplusage canon in the statutory context. However, the case for reexamination and
reformulation of the canon is similar, whether the canon is invoked in the contractual or statutory
context.
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the Plain Meaning Rule to do the work it is expected to do, courts must
begin to take account of a more nuanced and accurate picture of the way
language is used and develop interpretive rules and interpretive practices
that more accurately reflect relevant language conventions. Linguistic
corpora can provide evidence-based content to otherwise vague and
poorly defined interpretive concepts like Plain Meaning and ambiguity.
Corpus evidence can also provide the tools necessary to evaluate and
possibly reformulate canons of contractual interpretation that are failing
to give a proper account of the linguistic conventions they are expected
to describe and predict.
CONCLUSION
Linguistic corpora will not provide answers to every interpretive
question. Judges and lawyers will have to decide the legal effect of the
linguistic information corpora provide. But corpora can provide
objective evidence of the linguistic conventions of the communities that
draft and are governed by the agreements judges and lawyers are called
upon to interpret. Corpus evidence can give content to otherwise vague
canons of interpretation and provide linguistic evidence to aid in the
evaluation of claims about the Plain Meaning (or ambiguity) of a
contractual text.

